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Asymmetric Information and Irreversible Investments: an Auction Model

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  • Joril Maeland

    (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)

Abstract

The owner of a real option does not have the necessary expertise to manage the investment project and needs to contract with an expert in order to exercise the real option. The potential managers (the experts) have private information about their respective cost of investing in the project. The project owner organizes an auction in which the experts participate. The winner of the contract is the expert who can exercise the investment project at the lowest cost. The optimal contract is incentive compatible, i.e., it induces the winner to follow the investment strategy preferred by the project owner. It is shown that private information increases the project owner's cost of exercising the option, which may lead to under-investment. The inefficiency due to under-investment decreases in the number of experts participating in the auction.

Suggested Citation

  • Joril Maeland, 2010. "Asymmetric Information and Irreversible Investments: an Auction Model," Multinational Finance Journal, Multinational Finance Journal, vol. 14(3-4), pages 255-289, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mfj:journl:v:14:y:2010:i:3-4:p:255-289
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    real options; investment strategy; private information; auction;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing

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