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On the interaction between imperfect compliance and technology adoption: taxes versus tradable emissions permits

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  • Clara Villegas-Palacio

    ()

  • Jessica Coria

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-010-9125-0
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Regulatory Economics.

Volume (Year): 38 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 274-291

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Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:38:y:2010:i:3:p:274-291

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100298

Related research

Keywords: Technological adoption; Environmental policy; Imperfect compliance; Enforcement; L51; Q55; K32; K42;

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References

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  1. Carmen Arguedas & Eva Camacho & José Zofío, 2010. "Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 261-274, October.
  2. Moledina, Amyaz A. & Coggins, Jay S. & Polasky, Stephen & Costello, Christopher, 2003. "Dynamic environmental policy with strategic firms: prices versus quantities," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2, Supple), pages 356-376, March.
  3. Roberts, Marc J. & Spence, Michael, 1976. "Effluent charges and licenses under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 193-208.
  4. Stoneman, P & Ireland, N J, 1983. "The Role of Supply Factors in the Diffusion of New Process Technology," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(369a), pages 66-78, Supplemen.
  5. Coria, Jessica, 2008. "Taxes, Permits, and the Diffusions of a New Technology," Discussion Papers, Resources For the Future dp-08-26-efd, Resources For the Future.
  6. Carlos Chávez & Mauricio Villena & Johan Stranlund, 2009. "The Choice of Policy Instruments to Control Pollution under Costly Enforcement and Incomplete Information," Working Papers, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción 01-2009, Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción.
  7. Philippe Quirion, 2004. "Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 29(3), pages 337-359, November.
  8. Stranlund, John K. & Chávez, Carlos A. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2009. "The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 183-191, September.
  9. Requate, Till & Unold, Wolfram, 2003. "Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement technology:: Will the true ranking please stand up?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 125-146, February.
  10. Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2002. "Prices versus quantities with incomplete enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 435-454, September.
  11. Finkelshtain, Israel & Kislev, Yoav, 1997. "Prices versus Quantities: The Political Perspective," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 83-100, February.
  12. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, David, 2006. "Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 110-131, January.
  13. Inés Macho-Stadler, 2006. "Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance," Working Papers 189, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  14. Till Requate & Wolfram Uunold, 2001. "On the Incentives Created by Policy Instruments to Adopt Advanced Abatement Technology if Firms are Asymmetric," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(4), pages 536-, December.
  15. Agnar Sandmo, 2002. "Efficient Environmental Policy with Imperfect Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(1), pages 85-103, September.
  16. Baldursson, F.M. & von der Fehr, N.-H. M., 1998. "Prices vs Quantities: The Irrelevance of Irreversibility," Memorandum 09/1998, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  17. Stranlund, John K. & Dhanda, Kanwalroop Kathy, 1999. "Endogenous Monitoring and Enforcement of a Transferable Emissions Permit System," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 267-282, November.
  18. Adam Jaffe & Richard Newell & Robert Stavins, 2002. "Environmental Policy and Technological Change," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 41-70, June.
  19. Coria, Jessica, 2009. "Unintended Impacts of Multiple Instruments on Technology Adoption," Discussion Papers, Resources For the Future dp-09-06-efd, Resources For the Future.
  20. Hoel, Michael & Karp, Larry, 2001. "Taxes versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley qt5fx9p7kf, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
  21. John K. Stranlund & Yakov Ben-Haim, 2006. "Price-Based vs. Quantity-Based Environmental Regulation under Knightian Uncertainty: An Info-Gap Robust Satisficing Perspective," Working Papers, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics 2006-1, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
  22. Heyes, Anthony, 2000. "Implementing Environmental Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 107-29, March.
  23. Harford, Jon D., 1987. "Self-reporting of pollution and the firm's behavior under imperfectly enforceable regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 293-303, September.
  24. Murphy, James J. & Stranlund, John K., 2006. "Direct and market effects of enforcing emissions trading programs: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 217-233, October.
  25. Sandra Rousseau & Stef Proost, 2005. "Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 32(3), pages 337-365, November.
  26. Harford, Jon D., 1978. "Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 26-43, March.
  27. Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November.
  28. Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Boyd, Roy, 1996. "Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 95-111, January.
  29. Requate, Till, 2005. "Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments--a survey," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2-3), pages 175-195, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Design standards and technology adoption: Welfare effects of increasing environmental fines when the number of firms is endogenous," DICE Discussion Papers 106, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  2. Min Chen & Konstantinos Serfes, 2012. "Minimum quality standard regulation under imperfect quality observability," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 269-291, April.
  3. Coria, Jessica & Villegas-Palacio, Clara & Cárdenas, Juan Camilo, 2011. "Should we tax or let firms trade emissons? An experimental analysis with policy implications for developing countries," Working Papers in Economics 516, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  4. Arguedas, Carmen, 2010. "Pollution Standards, Technology Investment and Fines for Non-Compliance," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2010/05, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
  5. Coria, Jessica & Villegas-Palacio, Clara & Cárdenas, J.C., 2012. "Why Do Environmental Taxes Work Better in Developed Countries?," Working Papers in Economics 521, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

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