We explore the efficacy of price and quantity controls in a dynamic set up in which the decisions of some agents are irreversible. We demonstrate that the assumption of irreversibility improves the performance of a tax relative that of a system of tradable quotas and significantly alters the optimal behavior of agents. We nevertheless conclude that taking account of the fact that agents' decisions may be irreversible does not lead to policy implications significantly different from those reached in a simpler model in which irreversibility is ignored.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number
09/1998.