Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance
AbstractIn this paper, we study the incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies in the presence of imperfect compliance. Surprisingly, incentives to adopt advanced abatement technologies remain intact under emission taxes and pollution abatement subsidies when compared to the perfect compliance scenario. However, under emission standards imperfect compliance increases firms’ incentives to invest under certain assumptions, whereas under an emission permit mechanism investment incentives decrease only if widespread non-compliance induces a (sufficient) reduction in the permit price. Our results are valid for fairly general characteristics of the monitoring and enforcement strategies commonly found in both, theoretical and empirical applications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History) in its series Working Papers in Economic Theory with number 2009/03.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: May 2009
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Francisco Tomás y Valiente, 5, 28049 Madrid
Web page: http://www.uam.es/departamentos/economicas/analecon/default.html
More information through EDIRC
environmental policy; technology adoption; monitoring; non-compliance;
Other versions of this item:
- Carmen Arguedas & Eva Camacho & José Zofío, 2010. "Environmental Policy Instruments: Technology Adoption Incentives with Imperfect Compliance," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 47(2), pages 261-274, October.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2009-05-16 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2009-05-16 (Law & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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