Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Choice of Policy Instruments to Control Pollution under Costly Enforcement and Incomplete Information

Contents:

Author Info

  • Carlos Chávez

    ()
    (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción)

  • Mauricio Villena

    ()
    (Escuela de Negocios, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez)

  • Johan Stranlund

Abstract

We analyze the cost of enforcing a system of firm specific emissions standards vis a vis a transferable emissions permit system in the context of complete and incomplete information. We also examine the optimality of a transferable emissions permit system when abatement costs and enforcement costs are considered. We show that under incomplete information, regulation based on each firm-specific emissions standards cannot be less costly than a transferable emissions permit system. In addition, we found that the distribution of emissions that minimize aggregate program costs differ from the distribution of emissions generated by a competitive transferable emissions permit system.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://educacion.facea.udec.cl/economia/?q=node/126
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found. If this is indeed the case, please notify (Hugo Salgado)
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Departamento de Economía, Universidad de Concepción in its series Working Papers with number 01-2009.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cnc:wpaper:01-2009

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Victoria 471, Conceptión
Web page: http://economia.udec.cl
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Environmental policy; cost-effectiveness; enforcement costs; incomplete information.;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Villegas, Clara & Coria, Jessica, 2009. "Taxes, Permits and the Adoption of Abatement Technology under Imperfect Compliance," Working Papers in Economics 368, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  2. Rohling, Moritz & Ohndorf, Markus, 2012. "Prices vs. Quantities with fiscal cushioning," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 169-187.
  3. Marcelo Caffera & Carlos Chávez, 2011. "The Cost-Effective Choice of Policy Instruments to Cap Aggregate Emissions with Costly Enforcement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(4), pages 531-557, December.
  4. Clara Villegas-Palacio & Jessica Coria, 2010. "On the interaction between imperfect compliance and technology adoption: taxes versus tradable emissions permits," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 274-291, December.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cnc:wpaper:01-2009. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Hugo Salgado).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.