Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements
AbstractWe analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean river flow and an increase in the variance of river flow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 41 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
Climate change; Game theory; Stability; Water allocation;
Other versions of this item:
- Erik Ansink & Arjan Ruijs, 2007. "Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements," Working Papers 2007.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
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