Sharing a River
AbstractA group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with that problem is convex: its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement: no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare distribution in the core satisfies this condition: its marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by GREEN in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0006.
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Common Property Resources; Fair Allocation; Core;
Other versions of this item:
- Ambec, S. & Sprumont, Y., 2000. "Sharing a River," Papers 00-06, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
- Ambec, Stefan & Sprumont, Yves, 2002. "Sharing a River," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- AMBEC, Steve & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2000. "Sharing a River," Cahiers de recherche 2000-08, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Ambec, S. & Sprumont, Y., 2000. "Sharing a River," Cahiers de recherche 2000-08, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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- Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "A Concept of Egalitarianism under Participation Constraints," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 615-35, May.
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