Mixed sharing rules
AbstractIt is wellknown that a group of individuals contributing to a joint production process with diminishing returns will tend, in equilibrium, to put in too little effort if shares of the output are exogenous, and will put in too much effort if their shares are proportional to their inputs. We consider 'mixed' sharing rules, in which some proportion of the output will be shared exogenously, and the rest proportionally. We examine the efficiency properties of such rules, compare them with serial sharing rules, and suggest a sharing game whose noncooperative equilibrium is, in certain circumstances, Pareto efficient
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings with number 196.
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/pastmeetings.asp
More information through EDIRC
surplus sharing; cost sharing; aggregative games;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-10-30 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002.
"Dissipation in Rent-seeking Contests with Entry Costs,"
Keele Economics Research Papers
KERP 2002/11, Centre for Economic Research, Keele University.
- Richard Cornes & Roger Hartley, 2002. "Dissipation in Rent-seeking Contests with Entry Costs," Game Theory and Information 0211001, EconWPA.
- Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1983. "On Commons and Tragedies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 787-92, September.
- Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1981. "Fair allocations in large economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 269-282, October.
- Corchon, Luis C. & Puy, M. Socorro, 1998. "Individual rationality and voting in cooperative production," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 83-90, April.
- Cauley, Jon & Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1999.
"Stakeholder Incentives and Reforms in China's State-Owned Enterprises: A Common-Property Theory,"
Staff General Research Papers
1670, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Cauley, Jon & Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1999. "Stakeholder incentives and reforms in China's state-owned enterprises: A common-property theory," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 191-206.
- Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler & Jon Cauley, 1998. "Stakeholder Incentives and Reforms in China’s State-Owned Enterprises: A Common-Property Theory," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 98/11, Department of Economics, Keele University.
- Watts, Alison, 1996. "On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 269-285, April.
- Watts, Alison, 2002. "Uniqueness of equilibrium in cost sharing games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 47-70, February.
- Cornes,Richard & Sandler,Todd, 1996. "The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521477185, April.
- Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.