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The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing

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  • Hervé Moulin

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  • Hervé Moulin, 2008. "The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(3), pages 379-405, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:379-405
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0275-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Watts, Alison, 1996. "On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 269-285, April.
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    3. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2005. "On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 1-35, November.
    4. Sprumont, Yves, 1998. "Ordinal Cost Sharing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 126-162, July.
    5. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-1037, September.
    6. HervÈ CrËs & HervÈ Moulin, 2003. "Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average cost," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(3), pages 1097-1115, August.
    7. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
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    10. Sorenson, John R & Tschirhart, John T & Whinston, Andrew B, 1978. "A Theory of Pricing under Decreasing Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 614-624, September.
    11. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1996. "Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Access Costs: Budget Balance versus Efficiency," Working Papers 96-31, Duke University, Department of Economics.
    12. Ramesh Johari & John N. Tsitsiklis, 2004. "Efficiency Loss in a Network Resource Allocation Game," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(3), pages 407-435, August.
    13. Ruben Juarez, 2008. "The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 34(1), pages 69-84, January.
    14. Moulin Herve & Shenker Scott, 1994. "Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 178-201, October.
    15. Louis J. Billera & David C. Heath, 1982. "Allocation of Shared Costs: A Set of Axioms Yielding A Unique Procedure," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 7(1), pages 32-39, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Fielbaum, Andres & Kucharski, Rafał & Cats, Oded & Alonso-Mora, Javier, 2022. "How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? aligning system’s optimum with users’ equilibrium," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 301(3), pages 956-973.
    2. Daniel Li Li & Erfang Shan, 2017. "Cost sharing on prices for games on graphs," Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 676-688, October.
    3. Nasri, Mostafa & Bastin, Fabian & Marcotte, Patrice, 2015. "Quantifying the social welfare loss in moral hazard models," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 245(1), pages 226-235.
    4. Hervé Moulin, 2010. "Auctioning or assigning an object: some remarkable VCG mechanisms," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(2), pages 193-216, February.
    5. Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2013. "Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 54(2), pages 359-403, October.
    6. Moulin, Hervé, 2009. "Almost budget-balanced VCG mechanisms to assign multiple objects," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 96-119, January.
    7. Gaëtan Fournier & Marco Scarsini, 2014. "Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria," Post-Print halshs-00983085, HAL.
    8. Moulin, Hervé, 2010. "An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 107-131, September.
    9. Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicoloó & Tridib Sharma & Levent Ülkü, 2013. "On Equal Cost Sharing in the Provision of an Excludable Public Good," Working Papers 1306, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    10. Tobias Harks & Konstantin Miller, 2011. "The Worst-Case Efficiency of Cost Sharing Methods in Resource Allocation Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(6), pages 1491-1503, December.
    11. Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio & Sen, Arunava & Sharma, Tridib & Ülkü, Levent, 2015. "On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 30-49.
    12. Ramesh Johari & John N. Tsitsiklis, 2011. "Parameterized Supply Function Bidding: Equilibrium and Efficiency," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(5), pages 1079-1089, October.
    13. Karl Jandoc & Ruben Juarez & James Roumasset, 2014. "Towards an Economics of Irrigation Networks," Working Papers 201416, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    14. Philipp von Falkenhausen & Tobias Harks, 2013. "Optimal Cost Sharing for Resource Selection Games," Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 38(1), pages 184-208, February.
    15. Tobias Harks & Max Klimm & Rolf Möhring, 2013. "Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 461-482, May.
    16. Vasilis Gkatzelis & Konstantinos Kollias & Tim Roughgarden, 2016. "Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 64(6), pages 1230-1238, December.
    17. Balmaceda, Felipe & Balseiro, Santiago R. & Correa, José R. & Stier-Moses, Nicolás E., 2016. "Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 137-155.
    18. Harks, Tobias & von Falkenhausen, Philipp, 2014. "Optimal cost sharing for capacitated facility location games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 239(1), pages 187-198.
    19. Harless, Patrick, 2017. "Wary of the worst: Maximizing award guarantees when new claimants may arrive," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 316-328.
    20. Herbert Hamers & Flip Klijn & Marco Slikker, 2013. "Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate," Working Papers 709, Barcelona School of Economics.
    21. Dobzinski, Shahar & Mehta, Aranyak & Roughgarden, Tim & Sundararajan, Mukund, 2018. "Is Shapley cost sharing optimal?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 130-138.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Price of anarchy; Cost sharing; Average cost; Serial cost; Incremental cost; C60; C72; D60;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C60 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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