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The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing

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  • Hervé Moulin

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 36 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 379-405

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:379-405

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Related research

Keywords: Price of anarchy; Cost sharing; Average cost; Serial cost; Incremental cost; C60; C72; D60;

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References

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  1. Sorenson, John R & Tschirhart, John T & Whinston, Andrew B, 1978. "A Theory of Pricing under Decreasing Costs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 68(4), pages 614-24, September.
  2. Moulin, Herve & Sprumont, Yves, 2004. "On Demand Responsiveness in Additive Cost Sharing," Working Papers 2004-03, Rice University, Department of Economics.
  3. Dov Samet & Yair Tauman, 1981. "The Determination of Marginal-Cost Prices Under a Set of Axioms," Discussion Papers 476, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
  5. HervÈ CrËs & HervÈ Moulin, 2003. "Commons with increasing marginal costs: random priority versus average cost," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(3), pages 1097-1115, 08.
  6. Sandholm, William H., 2001. "Potential Games with Continuous Player Sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 81-108, March.
  7. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1996. "Strategyproof Sharing of Submodular Access Costs: Budget Balance versus Efficiency," Working Papers 96-31, Duke University, Department of Economics.
  8. Sprumont, Y., 1996. "Ordinal Cost Sharing," Cahiers de recherche 9624, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  9. Ruben Juarez, 2008. "The worst absolute surplus loss in the problem of commons: random priority versus average cost," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 69-84, January.
  10. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Fictitious Play Property for Games with Identical Interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 258-265, January.
  11. Moulin Herve & Shenker Scott, 1994. "Average Cost Pricing versus Serial Cost Sharing: An Axiomatic Comparison," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 178-201, October.
  12. Watts, Alison, 1996. "On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 269-285, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Jordi Massó & Antonio Nicoloó & Tridib Sharma & Levent Ülkü, 2013. "On Equal Cost Sharing in the Provision of an Excludable Public Good," Working Papers 1306, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  2. Ruben Juarez & Rajnish Kumar, 2012. "Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks," Working Papers 201203, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
  3. Moulin, Hervé, 2010. "An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 107-131, September.
  4. Gaëtan Fournier & Marco Scarsini, 2014. "Hotelling Games on Networks: Efficiency of Equilibria," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14033, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  5. Tobias Harks & Max Klimm & Rolf Möhring, 2013. "Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 461-482, May.

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