A group of agents located along a river have quasi-liner preferences over water and money. We ask how water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ in its series Cahiers de recherche with number
2000-08.
AMBEC, Steve & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2000.
"Sharing a River,"
Cahiers de recherche
2000-08, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
[Downloadable!]
Ambec, S. & Sprumont, Y., 2000.
"Sharing a River,"
Papers
00-06, Laval - Recherche en Energie.
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