Sequential competitions with a middle-mover advantage

This paper investigates the incentives that drive advantageous positions in sequential competitions. Sequential competitions have been shown to have either a first- or last-mover advantage. In contrast, this paper illustrates a general sequential-move competition where the first- and last-moving agents are the least profitable while the middle-moving agent is guaranteed to earn the highest possible payoff. This result provide for a new intuition about the underlying incentives in a sequential decision structure which are tested using a multiple-round laboratory experiment. Experimental data aggregated across all rounds support the prediction of a first- and last-mover disadvantage along with a middle-mover advantage. Furthermore, the data suggest that subjects learn as they gain experience with this competition. In this manner, a sequential decision structure with inexperienced agents will benefit the first- and middle-moving agents, whereas the same decision structure with experienced agents will only benefit the middle-moving agents.