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Banks and managerial discipline: Does regulatory monitoring play a role?

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  • Palvia, Ajay A.

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of performance, board independence, and regulatory evaluations on CEO turnover in a recent sample of banks. Similar to earlier studies, the results suggest weak performance and greater board independence are positively related to CEO turnover. In addition, poor regulatory ratings and recent rating downgrades are found to have a positive impact on turnover, not fully explained by performance or board characteristics. Finally, the relation between CEO turnover and weak regulatory evaluations is only significant for banks with more independent boards. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that regulatory monitoring enhances managerial discipline in banks but that such discipline may be severely limited in banks with less independent boards.

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  • Palvia, Ajay A., 2011. "Banks and managerial discipline: Does regulatory monitoring play a role?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 56-68, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:51:y:2011:i:1:p:56-68
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    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Zhongdong & Ebrahim, Alireza, 2018. "Turnover threat and CEO risk-taking behavior in the banking industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 87-105.
    2. Gang Bai & Qiurong Yang & Elyas Elyasiani, 2022. "Managerial Risk-Taking Incentives and Bank Earnings Management: Evidence from FAS 123R," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(21), pages 1-21, October.
    3. Gaul, Lewis & Palvia, Ajay, 2013. "Are regulatory management evaluations informative about bank accounting returns and risk?," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 1-21.
    4. Kick, Thomas & Nehring, Inge & Schertler, Andrea, 2017. "Do all new brooms sweep clean? Evidence for outside bank appointments," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 135-151.
    5. Srivastav, Abhishek & Keasey, Kevin & Mollah, Sabur & Vallascas, Francesco, 2017. "CEO turnover in large banks: Does tail risk matter?," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 37-55.
    6. Luo, Yongli, 2015. "CEO power, ownership structure and pay performance in Chinese banking," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 3-16.
    7. Zhongdong Chen, 2020. "Does Independent Industry Expertise Improve Board Effectiveness? Evidence From Bank CEO Turnovers," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 20(3), pages 665-699, September.
    8. Ajay A. Palvia, 2012. "Management Turnover, Regulatory Oversight and Performance: Evidence from Community Banks," Chapters, in: James R. Barth & Chen Lin & Clas Wihlborg (ed.), Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance, chapter 26, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Rim Boussaada & Aymen Ammari & Nouha Ben Arfa, 2018. "Board characteristics and MENA banks' credit risk: A fuzzy-set analysis," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2284-2303.
    10. Fang, Hao & Lee, Jen-Sin & Chung, Chien-Ping & Lee, Yen-Hsien & Wang, Wen-Hao, 2020. "Effect of CEO power and board strength on bank performance in China," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    11. Inoguchi, Masahiro, 2013. "Interbank market, stock market, and bank performance in East Asia," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 136-156.
    12. Adeabah, David, 2018. "CEO power and board structure of banks: a developing country’s perspective," EconStor Preprints 191529, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    13. narjess BOUABDALLAH & jamel Eddine HENCHIRI, 2020. "L' impact des mécanismes de gouvernance interne sur le risque opérationnel bancaire," Journal of Academic Finance, RED research unit, university of Gabes, Tunisia, vol. 11(1), pages 151-189, June.
    14. Xiaolou Yang, 2017. "A Study of Alignment between Management and Shareholders on China Financial Firms," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 7(6), pages 1-6.
    15. Lerong He & Rong Yang, 2014. "Does Industry Regulation Matter? New Evidence on Audit Committees and Earnings Management," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 123(4), pages 573-589, September.

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