Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Regulator Scrutiny and Bank CEO Incentives

Contents:

Author Info

  • Elizabeth Webb

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    No abstract is available for this item.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10693-007-0023-2
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Financial Services Research.

    Volume (Year): 33 (2008)
    Issue (Month): 1 (February)
    Pages: 5-20

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:33:y:2008:i:1:p:5-20

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102934

    Related research

    Keywords: Banks; regulatory ratings; CEO compensation;

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Berger, Allen N & Davies, Sally M & Flannery, Mark J, 2000. "Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 641-67, August.
    2. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1997. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," NBER Working Papers 6213, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, 2003. "The corporate governance of banks," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 91-107.
    4. Kose John & Yiming Qian, 2003. "Incentive features in CEO compensation in the banking industry," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 109-121.
    5. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
    6. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December.
    7. Kose John & Hamid Mehran & Yiming Qian, 2007. "Regulation, subordinated debt, and incentive features of CEO compensation in the banking industry," Staff Reports 308, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    8. Houston, Joel F. & James, Christopher, 1995. "CEO compensation and bank risk Is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 405-431, November.
    9. Core, John & Guay, Wayne, 1999. "The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 151-184, December.
    10. Gregory Sierra & Eli Talmor & James Wallace, 2006. "An Examination of Multiple Governance Forces within Bank Holding Companies," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 105-123, April.
    11. Huson, Mark R. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Parrino, Robert, 2004. "Managerial succession and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 237-275, November.
    12. Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks, 2003. "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2351-2374, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Klaus Schaeck & Martin Cihak & Andrea Maechler & Stephanie Stolz, 2011. "Who Disciplines Bank Managers?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, European Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 197-243.
    2. Riachi, Ilham & Schwienbacher, Armin, 2013. "Securitization of corporate assets and executive compensation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 235-251.
    3. Hagendorff, Jens & Vallascas, Francesco, 2011. "CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 1078-1095, September.
    4. Bornemann, Sven & Pfingsten, Andreas & Kick, Thomas & Schertler, Andrea, 2014. "Earnings baths by bank CEOs during turnovers," Discussion Papers 05/2014, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
    5. David VanHoose, 2010. "Regulation of Bank Management Compensation," NFI Policy Briefs 2010-PB-06, Indiana State University, Scott College of Business, Networks Financial Institute.
    6. Palvia, Ajay A., 2011. "Banks and managerial discipline: Does regulatory monitoring play a role?," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 56-68, February.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jfsres:v:33:y:2008:i:1:p:5-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.