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Fiscal policy coordination in the EMU

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  • Ferré, Montserrat

Abstract

The objective of this article is to compare the outcomes of fiscal coordination under a narrow and a broad agenda in the European Monetary Union (EMU). The EMU (narrow) approach to fiscal coordination will lead to higher volatility of interest rates, output, inflation and average budget deficits than broad coordination. Further, fiscal authorities will prefer a broad type of coordination, although there will be incentives to deviate. Hence, to promote broad coordination in a monetary union like the EMU clear rules indicating how to operate and an effective forum to encourage dialogue should be put into place.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Policy Modeling.

Volume (Year): 30 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 221-235

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jpolmo:v:30:y:2008:i:2:p:221-235

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505735

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Onorante, Luca & Pedregal, Diego J. & Pérez, Javier J. & Signorini, Sara, 2008. "The usefulness of infra-annual government cash budgetary data for fiscal forecasting in the euro area," Working Paper Series 0901, European Central Bank.
  2. Claudiu T. Albulescu & Cornel Oros, 2014. "The policy-mix in the Euro Area: The Role of Financial Stability," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 705-717.
  3. Bonatti, Luigi & Cristini, Annalisa, 2008. "Breaking the Stability Pact: Was it predictable?," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 793-810.
  4. Jes?s Crespo-Cuaresma & Octavio Fern?ndez-Amador, 2010. "Business cycle convergence in EMU: A second look at the second moment," Working Papers 2010-25, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  5. Trachanas, Emmanouil & Katrakilidis, Constantinos, 2013. "Fiscal deficits under financial pressure and insolvency: Evidence for Italy, Greece and Spain," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 730-749.
  6. Halkos, George E. & Tzeremes, Nickolaos G., 2009. "Economic efficiency and growth in the EU enlargement," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 847-862, November.
  7. Escario, Regina & Gadea, María Dolores & Sabaté, Marcela, 2012. "Multicointegration, seigniorage and fiscal sustainability. Spain 1857–2000," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 270-283.

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