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Would Fiscal Authorities in the EMU prefer to coordinate?

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  • Ferré Carracedo, Montserrat
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    Abstract

    This article studies whether fiscal authorities would prefer to operate like in the current EMU or to coordinate according to the theoretical literature. The EMU approach will lead to higher volatility of interest rates, output, inflation and average budget deficits, but the SGP deficit target will be breached less often. Keywords: fiscal policy coordination, monetary union, Stability and Growth Pact. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/3687
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2072/3687.

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    Date of creation: 2006
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    Handle: RePEc:urv:wpaper:2072/3687

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    Keywords: Política fiscal; Unió Monetària Europea; Dèficit pressupostari; Unió Europea; Stability and Growth Pact;

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    1. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, 04.
    2. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2001. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions and commitment versus discretion in a monetary union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 45(4-6), pages 977-987, May.
    3. Beetsma, R.M.W.J. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1995. "Monetary Union without Fiscal Coordination May Discipline Policymakers," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 95-22, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    4. Dixit, Avinash & Lambertini, Luisa, 2003. "Symbiosis of monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 235-247, August.
    5. Engwerda, Jacob C. & van Aarle, Bas & Plasmans, Joseph E. J., 2002. "Cooperative and non-cooperative fiscal stabilization policies in the EMU," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 451-481, March.
    6. Marco Buti & Werner Roeger & Jan In't Veld, 2001. "Stabilizing Output and Inflation: Policy Conflicts and Co-operation under a Stability Pact," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 801-828, December.
    7. Roel Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Frank Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series 599, CESifo Group Munich.
    8. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 329-43, March.
    9. Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2008. "Time inconsistency and free-riding in a monetary union," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 308, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
    11. Vives, Xavier, 1984. "Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 71-94, October.
    12. Amir Ziv, 1993. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly: The Truth-Telling Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(3), pages 455-465, Autumn.
    13. Shapiro, Carl, 1986. "Exchange of Cost Information in Oligopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 433-46, July.
    14. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
    15. Montserrat Ferré, 2005. "Should Fiscal Authorities Co-operate in a Monetary Union with Public Deficit Targets?," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 539-550, 09.
    16. Henrik Enderlein, 2004. "Break it, Don't Fix it!," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(5), pages 1039-1046, December.
    17. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
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