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Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules

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Wyplosz, Charles

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Abstract

The Paper explores how fiscal policy can be made both more disciplined and more counter-cyclical. It first examines whether the decline of public debts observed in the OECD area during the 1990s can be explained either by less activism or by a priority towards consolidation. It then argues that rules, for example the Stability and Growth Pact, are less likely to deliver the desired outcome than institutions. Drawing a parallel with monetary policy, it examines how a Fiscal Policy Committee could reproduce what Monetary Policy Committees have achieved in central banking.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3238.

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Date of creation: Feb 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3238

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Related research
Keywords: cyclicality; discipline; fiscal policy; institutions; rules and discretion;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization
H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. John B. Taylor, 2000. "Reassessing Discretionary Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 21-36, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. von Hagen, J. & Hallett, A.H. & Strauch, R., 2001. "Budgetary Consolidation in EMU," European Economy - Economic Papers 148, Commission of the EC, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN).
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ashoka Mody & Stefania Fabrizio, 2006. "Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline?," IMF Working Papers 06/123, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Richard Morris & Hedwig Ongena & Ludger Schuknecht, 2006. "The reform and implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact," Occasional Paper Series 47, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  3. Alessandro Girardi & Paolo Paesani, 2008. "Structural Reforms and Fiscal Discipline in Europe," Transition Studies Review, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 389-402, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Buti, Marco & Eijffinger, Sylvester & Franco, Daniele, 2005. "The stability pact pains : a forward-looking assessment of the reform debate," Discussion Paper 101, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Peter Claeys, 2005. "Policy mix and debt sustainability: evidence from fiscal policy rules," Economics Working Papers ECO2005/01, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Gábor Orbán & György Szapáry, 2004. "The Stability and Growth Pact from the Perspective Of the New Member States," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-709, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Mihailov, Alexander & Ullrich, Katrin, 2007. "Independence and Accountability of Monetary and Fiscal Policy Committees," ZEW Discussion Papers 07-044, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. P R Agénor & D Yilmaz, 2006. "The Tyranny of Rules: Fiscal Discipline, Productive Spending, and Growth," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 73, Economics, The Univeristy of Manchester. [Downloadable!]
  9. Krogstrup, Signe & Wyplosz, Charles, 2006. "A Common Pool Theory of Deficit Bias Correction," CEPR Discussion Papers 5866, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Buiter, Willem H, 2006. "How Robust is the New Conventional Wisdom? The Surprising Fragility of the Theoretical Foundations of Inflation Targeting and Central Bank Independence," CEPR Discussion Papers 5772, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Felicity C Barker & Robert A Buckle & Robert W St Clair, 2008. "Roles of Fiscal Policy in New Zealand," Treasury Working Paper Series 08/02, New Zealand Treasury. [Downloadable!]
  12. George Kopits, 2007. "Fiscal Responsibility Framework: International Experience and Implications for Hungary," MNB Occasional Papers 2007/62, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (The Central Bank of Hungary). [Downloadable!]
  13. Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-lewis, 2006. "Fiscal Stabilisation Policy and Fiscal Institutions," WEF Working Papers 0007, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Canale, R.R., 2008. "Central bank reaction to public deficit and sound public finance: the case of the European Monetary Union," MPRA Paper 8789, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Wolff, Guntram B, 2007. "Schuldenanstieg und Haftungsausschluss im deutschen Föderalstaat: Zur Rolle des Moral Hazard
    [Increasing debt and potential bail-out clauses in the German federation: on the role of moral hazard]
    ," MPRA Paper 11248, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  16. Anthony Annett, 2006. "Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How Fiscal Policy Did and Did Not Change Under Europe's Fiscal Framework," IMF Working Papers 06/116, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  17. Xavier Debrun & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007. "The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 07/171, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  18. Ondřej Schneider & Petr Hedbávný & Jan Zápal, 2007. "A Fiscal Rule that Has Teeth: A Suggestion for a “Fiscal Sustainability Council” Underpinned by the Financial Markets," AUCO Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 1(1), pages 32-53, March. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Frits Bos, 2007. "The Dutch fiscal framework; history, current practice and the role of the CPB," CPB Documents 150, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  20. Canale, Rosaria Rita, 2006. "Positive effects of fiscal expansions on growth and debt," MPRA Paper 1432, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
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