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Fiscal Policy: Institutions vs. Rules

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Paper provided by Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies in its series IHEID Working Papers with number 03-2002.

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Length: 39
Date of creation: 12 Mar 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gii:giihei:heiwp03-2002

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Keywords: International Economics; Fiscal Policy; Rules; Institutions;

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References

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  1. Gruen, David W R, 1991. "What People Know and What Economists Think They Know: Surveys on Ricardian Equivalence," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(56), pages 1-9, June.
  2. Persson, Mats & Persson, Torsten & Svensson, Lars E O, 1987. "Time Consistency of Fiscal and Monetary Policy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1419-31, November.
  3. Olivier Blanchard & Roberto Perotti, 2002. "An Empirical Characterization Of The Dynamic Effects Of Changes In Government Spending And Taxes On Output," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1329-1368, November.
  4. Sachs, Jeffrey & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 632, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Giavazzi, Francesco & Jappelli, Tullio & Pagano, Marco, 2000. "Searching for non-linear effects of fiscal policy: Evidence from industrial and developing countries," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(7), pages 1259-1289, June.
  6. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1997. "Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries: Composition and Macroeconomic Effects," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 44(2), pages 210-248, June.
  7. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1996. "Destabilizing Effects of Exchange-Rate Escape Clauses," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt15n3p5dt, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  8. Marco BUTI & Daniele FRANCO & Hedwig ONGENA, 1997. "Budgeetary Policies during Recessions : Retrospective Application of the Stability and Growth Pact” to the Post-War Period," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 1997041, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
  9. Eichengreen, Barry & Bayoumi, Tamim, 1994. "The political economy of fiscal restrictions: Implications for Europe from the United States," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 783-791, April.
  10. Perotti, Roberto & Strauch, Rolf & von Hagen, Jürgen, 1997. "Sustainability of Public Finances," CEPR Discussion Papers 1781, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R, 1994. "Fiscal Flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for Monetary Union in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 1057, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Kletzer, Kenneth M. & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2000. "Monetary union and fiscal federalism," ZEI Working Papers B 01-2000, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  13. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, 04.
  14. Olivier Jeanne & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2001. "International bailouts, moral hazard and conditionality," Economic Policy, CEPR & CES & MSH, vol. 16(33), pages 407-432, October.
  15. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1046-59, November.
  16. B. Douglas Bernheim, 1988. "Ricardian Equivalence: An Evaluation of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 2330, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Etro, Federico & Ageloni, Ignazio & Alesina, Alberto, 2005. "International Unions," Scholarly Articles 4553008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  18. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from US States," CEPR Discussion Papers 1088, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1996. "Fiscal Adjustments in OECD Countries: Composition and Macroeconomic Effects," NBER Working Papers 5730, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Jürgen von Hagen & Andrew Hughes Hallett & Rolf Strauch, 2001. "Budgetary Consolidation in EMU," European Economy - Economic Papers 148, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  21. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
  22. Barry Eichengreen & Ricardo Hausmann & Jürgen Von Hagen, 1999. "Reforming Budgetary Institutions in Latin America: The Case for a National Fiscal Council," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 10(4), pages 415-442, October.
  23. Becker, Torbjorn, 1997. "An investigation of Ricardian equivalence in a common trends model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 405-431, August.
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Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Why France will have no budget rule
    by in Bruegel blog on 2012-08-14 14:00:20
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Cited by:
  1. Petr Hedbávný & Ondřej Schneider & Jan Zápal, 2004. "Does the Enlarged European Union Need a Better Fiscal Pact?," Working Papers IES 55, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised 2004.
  2. Larch, Martin & Jonung, Lars & Fischer, Jonas, 2008. "101 proposals to reform the Stability and Growth Pact. Why so many? A survey," MPRA Paper 20592, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Carsten Hefeker, 2003. "Credible at last? Reforming the Stability Pact," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 15-18, January.
  4. Campbell Leith & Simon Wren-Lewis, 2005. "Fiscal Stabilization Policy and Fiscal Institutions," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(4), pages 584-597, Winter.
  5. Juan Carlos Echeverry & Jorge Alexander Bonilla & Andrés Moya, 2006. "Rigideces Institucionales y Flexibilidad Presupuestaria: Origen, Motivación y Efectos sobre el Presupuesto," IDB Publications 9091, Inter-American Development Bank.
  6. Karsten Staehr, 2007. "Fiscal policies and business cycles in an enlarged euro area," Bank of Estonia Working Papers 2007-03, Bank of Estonia, revised 08 Mar 2007.
  7. Fabrizio Balassone & Daniele Franco & Stefania Zotteri, 2006. "EMU fiscal indicators: a misleading compass?," Empirica, Springer, vol. 33(2), pages 63-87, June.
  8. Paolo Biraschi, . "Searching for the optimal EMU fiscal rule:an ex-post analysis of the SGP reform proposals," Working Papers wp2008-7, Department of the Treasury, Ministry of the Economy and of Finance.

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