This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Fiscal Rule that Has Teeth: A Suggestion for a “Fiscal Sustainability Council” Underpinned by the Financial Markets

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Ondřej Schneider () (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)
Petr Hedbávný () (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)
Jan Zápal () (Institute of Economic Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper, we set out to examine an efficient fiscal-policy framework for a monetary union. We illustrate that fiscal policy’s bias toward budget deficit only temporarily ceased at the end of the 20th century as European countries endeavored to qualify for euro-zone membership, which compelled strict limits on budgetary deficits. We then explore which mechanisms might instill a sense of fiscal disciple in governments. We find that most mechanisms suffer from the incentive-incompatible setup whereby governments restrict their own fiscal-policy freedom. We argue that even multilateral fiscal rules, such as the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact, suffer from the same endogeneity flaw. Consequently, we argue that a fiscal rule must incorporate an external authority that would impartially assess fiscal-policy developments. Using U.S. debt and bond-market data at the state level, we show that financial markets represent a good candidate as, vis-à-vis the American states, they do differentiate state debt according to the level of debt. We thus argue for a fiscal institution – what we call the Fiscal Sustainability Council– that would actively bring financial markets into the fiscal-policy process, and we explain the technique whereby this could be effected.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://auco.fsv.cuni.cz/storage/9_2007_01_032.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Article provided by Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies in its journal AUCO Czech Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 1 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 32-53
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2007_032

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Opletalova 26, CZ-110 00 Prague
Phone: +420 2 222112330
Fax: +420 2 22112304
Email:
Web page: http://ies.fsv.cuni.cz/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://auco.cuni.cz/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Natálie Švarcová).

Related research
Keywords: fiscal policy; European Union; sustainability;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. George Kopits & Steven A. Symansky, 1998. "Fiscal Policy Rules," IMF Occasional Papers 162, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Jan J.G. Lemmen & Charles A.E. Goodhart, 1999. "Credit Risks and European Government Bond Markets: A Panel Data Econometric Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 25(1), pages 77-107, Winter. [Downloadable!]
  3. Volbert Alexander & Peter Anker, 1997. "Fiscal Discipline and the Question of Convergence of National Interest Rates in the European Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 335-352, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier, 2003. "Reconciling Stability and Growth: Smart Pacts and Structural Reforms," CEPR Discussion Papers 3930, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Silvia Ardagna, 2004. "Financial markets’ behavior around episodes of large changes in the fiscal stance," Working Paper Series 390, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  6. Wyplosz, Charles, 2002. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," CEPR Discussion Papers 3238, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kerstin Bernoth & Jürgen von Hagen & Ludger Schuknecht, 2004. "Sovereign risk premia in the European government bond market," Working Paper Series 369, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
  8. Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R., 1995. "Fiscal flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for monetary union in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 253-274, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Barry Eichengreen & Charles Wyplosz, 1998. "The Stability Pact: more than a minor nuisance?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 13(26), pages 65-113, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. J. D. Craig & George Kopits, 1998. "Transparency in Government Operations," IMF Occasional Papers 158, International Monetary Fund.
  11. Copeland, Laurence & Jones, Sally-Anne, 2001. "Default Probabilities of European Sovereign Debt: Market-Based Estimates," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 8(5), pages 321-24, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Bernoth, Kerstin & Schuknecht, Ludger & von Hagen, Jürgen, 2004. "Sovereign Risk Premia in the European Bond Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 4465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from US States," CEPR Discussion Papers 1088, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Thomas Laubach, 2003. "New evidence on the interest rate effects of budget deficits and debt," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2003-12, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
  15. Lorenzo Codogno & Carlo Favero & Alessandro Missale, 2003. "Yield spreads on EMU government bonds," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 18(37), pages 503-532, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Jan J.G. Lemmen, 1999. "Managing Government Default Risk in Federal States," FMG Special Papers sp116, Financial Markets Group. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.