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Quality of government institutions and spreads on sovereign credit default swaps

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  • Chen, Hsien-Yi
  • Chen, Sheng-Syan

Abstract

We examine how the quality of government institutions affects the likelihood of sovereign default. We find both economically and statistically significant adverse effects of country governance indicators on sovereign credit default swap spreads. The evidence suggests that better-quality governance enhances a country’s willingness to repay debt, and hence reduces the probability of sovereign default. The results still hold after we account for potential endogeneity and conduct a number of robustness tests.

Suggested Citation

  • Chen, Hsien-Yi & Chen, Sheng-Syan, 2018. "Quality of government institutions and spreads on sovereign credit default swaps," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 82-95.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:87:y:2018:i:c:p:82-95
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2018.05.008
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutional quality; Sovereign default; Credit risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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