Do professionals choke under pressure?
Abstract
High rewards or the threat of severe punishment provide strong motivation but also create psychological pressure, which might induce performance decrements. By analyzing the performance of professional football players in penalty kick situations, the paper provides empirical evidence for the existence of detrimental incentive effects. Two pressure variables are considered in particular: (1) the importance of success and (2) the presence of spectators. There are plenty of situations in which pressure arises in the workplace. Knowing how individuals perform under pressure conditions is crucial because it has implications for the design of the workplace and the design of incentive schemes.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
Volume (Year): 65 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
Pages: 636-653
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Dohmen, Thomas, 2005. "Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure?," IZA Discussion Papers 1905, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Dohmen, Thomas J., 2008. "Do professionals choke under pressure?," Open Access publications from Maastricht University urn:nbn:nl:ui:27-18491, Maastricht University.
- Thomas J. Dohmen, 2010. "Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure?," Working Papers id:2742, eSocialSciences.
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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Citations
Blog mentions
As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- How bonuses backfire
by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2011-09-19 14:06:31 - Does fear work?
by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2011-07-31 13:55:23 - Does Fear of Job Loss Work?
by Mark Thoma in Economist's View on 2011-08-03 07:33:00 - Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure?
by Ariel Goldring in Free Market Mojo on 2010-08-22 16:17:36 - The left & shareholder activism
by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2012-05-08 13:51:01
Cited by:
- Böheim, René & Lackner, Mario, 2013.
"Gender and Competition: Evidence from Jumping Competitions,"
IZA Discussion Papers
7243, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- René Böheim & Mario Lackner, 2013. "Gender and Competition: Evidence from Jumping Competitions," Economics working papers 2013-05, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Eriksson, Tor & Poulsen, Anders & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2008.
"Feedback and Incentives: Experimental Evidence,"
IZA Discussion Papers
3440, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Eriksson, Tor & Poulsen, Anders & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2009. "Feedback and incentives: Experimental evidence," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 679-688, December.
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- Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 0812, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Tor Eriksson & Anders Poulsen & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2008. "Feedback and Incentives : Experimental Evidence," Post-Print halshs-00276396, HAL.
- Paserman, Daniele, 2007.
"Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environments: Evidence from Professional Tennis Players,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2834, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Paserman, Marco Daniele, 2007. "Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environments: Evidence from Professional Tennis Players," CEPR Discussion Papers 6335, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- M. Daniele Paserman, 2010. "Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environments? Evidence from Professional Tennis Players," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2010-047, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Lukas Menkhoff & Maik Schmeling & Ulrich Schmidt, 2010.
"Are All Professional Investors Sophisticated?,"
German Economic Review,
Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11, pages 418-440, November.
- Menkhoff, Lukas & Schmeling, Maik & Schmidt, Ulrich, 2008. "Are all professional investors sophisticated?," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Leibniz Universität Hannover dp-397, Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät.
- Björn Bartling & Leif Brandes & Daniel Schunk, 2012.
"Expectations as reference points: field evidence from experienced subjects in a competitive, high-stakes environment,"
ECON - Working Papers
073, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
- Björn Bartling & Leif Brandes & Daniel Schunk, 2012. "Expectations as Reference Points: Field Evidence from Experienced Subjects in a Competitive, High-Stakes Environment," CESifo Working Paper Series 3830, CESifo Group Munich.
- Grichnik, Dietmar & Smeja, Alexander & Welpe, Isabell, 2010. "The importance of being emotional: How do emotions affect entrepreneurial opportunity evaluation and exploitation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 15-29, October.
- Bannier, Christina E. & Feess, Eberhard, 2010. "When high-powered incentive contracts reduce performance: choking under pressure as a screening device," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 135, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
- Christos Genakos & Mario Pagliero, 2009. "Risk Taking and Performance in Multistage Tournaments: Evidence from Weightlifting Competitions," CEP Discussion Papers dp0928, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
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