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Large stakes and big mistakes

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Author Info
Dan Ariely
Uri Gneezy
George Loewenstein
Nina Mazar

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Abstract

Most upper-management and sales force personnel, as well as workers in many other jobs, are paid based on performance, which is widely perceived as motivating effort and enhancing productivity relative to non-contingent pay schemes. However, psychological research suggests that excessive rewards can in some cases produce supra-optimal motivation, resulting in a decline in performance. To test whether very high monetary rewards can decrease performance, we conducted a set of experiments at MIT, the University of Chicago, and rural India. Subjects in our experiment worked on different tasks and received performance-contingent payments that varied in amount from small to large relative to their typical levels of pay. With some important exceptions, we observed that high reward levels can have detrimental effects on performance.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Boston in its series Working Papers with number 05-11.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedbwp:05-11

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Keywords: Microeconomics;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
  2. Frey, Bruno S & Jegen, Reto, 2001. " Motivation Crowding Theory," Journal of Economic Surveys, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Michael T. Rauh & Giulio Seccia, 2006. "Agency and Anxiety," Working Papers 2006-02, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
  2. M. Daniele Paserman, 2007. "Gender Differences in Performance in Competitive Environments: Evidence from Professional Tennis Players," IZA Discussion Papers 2834, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Andrew E. Clark & David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Effort and Comparison Income: Experimental and Survey Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 2169, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Andrew E. Clark & David Masclet & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Effort and comparison income: Survey and experimental evidence," PSE Working Papers 2006-03, PSE (Ecole normale supérieure). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Thomas J. Dohmen, 2005. "Do Professionals Choke Under Pressure?," IZA Discussion Papers 1905, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan & Moore, Don, 2009. "Does the Better-Than-Average Effect Show That People Are Overconfident?: An Experiment," MPRA Paper 13168, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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