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Agency theory, performance evaluation, and the hypothetical construct of intrinsic motivation

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  • Kunz, Alexis H.
  • Pfaff, Dieter
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Accounting, Organizations and Society.

    Volume (Year): 27 (2002)
    Issue (Month): 3 (April)
    Pages: 275-295

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:aosoci:v:27:y:2002:i:3:p:275-295

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    1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August.
    2. Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1619-1650, 08.
    3. Gneezy, Uri & Rustichini, Aldo, 2000. "A Fine is a Price," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(1), pages 1-17, January.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    5. Matthew Rabin., 1992. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," Economics Working Papers, University of California at Berkeley 92-199, University of California at Berkeley.
    6. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 183, CESifo Group Munich.
    7. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
    8. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
    9. Robert Gibbons, 1998. "Incentives in Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 115-132, Fall.
    10. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    11. Murphy, Kevin J., 1999. "Executive compensation," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 2485-2563 Elsevier.
    12. Camerer, Colin, et al, 1997. "Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 407-41, May.
    13. Conlisk, John, 1989. "Three Variants on the Allais Example," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 79(3), pages 392-407, June.
    14. R. Benabou & J. Tirole, 1999. "Self-Confidence and Social Interactions," Princeton Economic Theory Papers, Economics Department, Princeton University 00s2, Economics Department, Princeton University.
    15. Joseph G. Haubrich, 1991. "Risk aversion, performance pay, and the principal-agent problem," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 9118, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    16. Edward P. Lazear, 1996. "Performance Pay and Productivity," NBER Working Papers 5672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October.
    18. Michi Kandori, 2010. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," Levine's Working Paper Archive 630, David K. Levine.
    19. Baiman, Stanley, 1990. "Agency research in managerial accounting: A second look," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 341-371.
    20. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, October.
    21. Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
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    Cited by:
    1. Peecher, Mark E. & Solomon, Ira & Trotman, Ken T., 2013. "An accountability framework for financial statement auditors and related research questions," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 596-620.
    2. Kirsten Bregn, 2013. "Detrimental Effects of Performance-Related Pay in the Public Sector? On the Need for a Broader Theoretical Perspective," Public Organization Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 21-35, March.
    3. Carolyn Stringer & Jeni Didham & Paul Theivananthampillai, 2011. "Motivation, pay satisfaction, and job satisfaction of front-line employees," Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management, Emerald Group Publishing, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 8(2), pages 161-179, June.
    4. Niklas Bengtsson & Per Engstrom, 2011. "Control and efficiency in the nonprofit sector: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment," Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website 00316, The Field Experiments Website.
    5. Adler, Paul S. & Chen, Clara Xiaoling, 2011. "Combining creativity and control: Understanding individual motivation in large-scale collaborative creativity," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 63-85, February.
    6. Sliwka, Dirk, 2006. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," IZA Discussion Papers 2293, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Marco van Herpen & C. Mirjam van Praag & Kees Cools, 2003. "The Effects of Performance Measurement and Compensation on Motivation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 03-048/3, Tinbergen Institute.

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