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Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 92 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 1138-1151
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:92:y:2002:i:4:p:1138-1151

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