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The nexus of judicial efficiency, social burden and default risk: Cross-country evidence

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  • Zhu, Xiaoquan
  • Peng, Hongfeng
  • Zhang, Zijian

Abstract

The paper investigates heterogeneous institutional costs related to firm bankruptcy and default risk over a comprehensive sample of 65 economies between 2003 and 2016. We find that corporate default risk is decreasing in judicial efficiency whereas it is increasing in potential social costs related to high unemployment rate. In the cross-sectional comparison, we find that firms with less cash reserves are more likely affected by judicial efficiency. Similarly, the impact of potential social costs induced by employment regulation is more pronounced in firms with higher staff expenses. Our main findings indicate that creditor protection is a crucial channel to lower corporate default risk, through which judicial efficiency alleviates the pressure from accelerating debt repayment. Besides, pro-labor regulations imposed by local governments facing high unemployment make it difficult for firms to reconcile the conflicts of labor input. It is conditional on contextual factors that whether the two types of institutional costs are complementary on default risk.

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  • Zhu, Xiaoquan & Peng, Hongfeng & Zhang, Zijian, 2020. "The nexus of judicial efficiency, social burden and default risk: Cross-country evidence," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 68(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:intfin:v:68:y:2020:i:c:s104244312030127x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.intfin.2020.101243
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Judicial efficiency; Social burden; Corporate default risk; Bankruptcy cost;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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