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Two Tier Reforms of Employment Protection: A Honeymoon Effect?

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  • Tito Boeri
  • Pietro Garibaldi

Abstract

Labor market reforms increasing flexibility at the margin have been recently paying out in terms of employment growth. This paper argues that two-tier labor market reforms have a transitional honeymoon, job creating effect. In a dynamic model of labor demand under uncertainty, the paper predicts that in the aftermath of reforms, beyond an increase in employment, there should be a reduction in employment inaction and in the mean and cross sectional variance of labor productivity. Based on a variety of firm-level data on Italy in the period 1995-2000, we find evidence of our empirical implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Tito Boeri & Pietro Garibaldi, 2007. "Two Tier Reforms of Employment Protection: A Honeymoon Effect?," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 37, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    • Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:37
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Labour demand; firing costs; employment protection reform.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General

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