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Do Better Institutions Mitigate Agency Problems? Evidence from Corporate Finance Choices

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Author Info
Mariassunta Giannetti (Bank of Italy, Research Department)

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Abstract

This paper examines how firm characteristics, the legal system and financial development affect corporate finance decisions using a novel and unexplored data set containing balance sheet information for listed and unlisted companies. Contrary to the previous literature, by using data on unlisted companies of small dimension, the paper shows that institutions play an important role in determining the extent of agency problems in corporate finance decisions. In particular, it emerges that in countries with good accounting standards and above-average creditor protection, it is easier for firms investing in intangible assets to obtain loans. Therefore, institutions that are capable of effectively protecting lenders are good substitutes for collateral. The protection of creditor rights is also important for guaranteeing access to long-term debt for firms operating in sectors with highly volatile returns. In contrast, if the law does not guarantee creditor rights sufficiently, lenders prefer to issue short-term debt because they can use the threat not to renew the loan to limit entrepreneurs' opportunistic behavior. In this case, inefficiencies due to the excessive liquidation of projects in temporary difficulty may arise. Ceteris paribus, firms are more leveraged in countries where the stock market is less developed. Moreover, unlisted firms appear systematically more indebted even after controlling for firm characteristics, such as profitability, size and the ability to provide collateral. Finally, institutions, which favor creditor rights and ensure stricter enforcement, are associated with higher leverage, but also with greater availability of long-term debt.

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Paper provided by Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department in its series Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) with number 376.

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Date of creation: Jul 2000
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Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_376_00

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Related research
Keywords: leverage; debt maturity; agency problems; enforcement; creditor rights;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

References listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ronald E. Shrieves & Drew Dahl & Michael F. Spivey, 2009. "Capital Market Regimes and Bank Structure in Europe," Working Papers 200807, Utah State University, Department of Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  2. Lieven Baert & Rudi Vander Vennet, 2008. "Bank Market Structure and Firm Capital Structure," Working Paper / FINESS 2.1, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Raquel FONSECA & Natalia UTRERO- GONZALEZ, 2005. "Financial Development, Labor and Market Regulations and Growth," Finance 0509016, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Mike Burkart & Tore Ellingsen, 2004. "In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 569-590, June. [Downloadable!]
  5. Patricia Crifo & Hind Sami, 2008. "Entrepreneurship, technological change and endogenous returns to ability," Post-Print hal-00243037_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  6. Eugenio Gaiotti & Andrea Generale, 2001. "Does monetary policy have asymmetric effects? A look at the investment decisions of Italian firms," Working Paper Series 110, European Central Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Giannetti, Mariassunta, 2001. "Risk sharing and firm size: theory and international evidence," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 0472, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 06 Nov 2001. [Downloadable!]
  8. Silvia Magri, 2006. "Debt maturity of Italian firms," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 574, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  9. Jun Qian & Philip E. Strahan, 2005. "How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans," NBER Working Papers 11052, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Paolo Angelini & Andrea Generale, 2005. "Firm Size Distribution: Do Financial Constraints Explain It All? Evidence From Survey Data," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 549, Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department. [Downloadable!]
  11. Müller, Elisabeth, 2005. "How Does Owners? Exposure to Idiosyncratic Risk Influence the Capital Structure of Private Companies?," ZEW Discussion Papers 05-14, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Bartholdy, Jan & Mateus, Cesário, 2006. "Debt and Taxes: Evidence from bank-financed unlisted firms," Finance Research Group Working Papers F-2006-02, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Business Studies. [Downloadable!]
  13. Vlachos, Jonas & Svaleryd, Helena, 2001. "Financial Markets, the Pattern of Specialization and Comparative Advantage. Evidence from OECD countries," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 449, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 03 Sep 2001. [Downloadable!]
  14. Karin Jõeveer, 2006. "Sources of capital structure : evidence from transition countries," Bank of Estonia Working Papers 2006-02, Bank of Estonia, revised 12 Nov 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Burkart, Mike & Ellingsen, Tore, 2002. "In-Kind Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3536, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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