Bidding in a possibly common-value auction
AbstractWe analyze a second-price auction with two bidders in which only one of the bidders is informed as to whether the object is valued commonly. We show that any equilibrium strategy of the bidder who is uninformed must be part of an equilibrium when both bidders instead know that the auction is not common value, regardless of the way in which the values are different. We derive sufficient conditions for equilibrium existence.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.
Volume (Year): 70 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836
Second-price auction Common value Model uncertainty;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Larson, Nathan, 2009. "Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 430-460, March.
- de Frutos, Maria-Angeles & Pechlivanos, Lambros, 2006. "Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 43-71, April.
- Krishna, Vijay, 2003. "Asymmetric English auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 261-288, October.
- Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1996.
"Toeholds and Takeovers,"
- Bulow, Jeremy I & Huang, Ming & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Toeholds and Takeovers," CEPR Discussion Papers 1486, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Klemperer & Jeremy Bulow, 1998. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W04, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Jeremy Bulow & Ming Huang & Paul Klemperer, 1999. "Toeholds and Takeovers," Finance 9903005, EconWPA.
- George Deltas & Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 2005. "Naive Bidding," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 328-338, March.
- Milgrom, Paul R, 1981. "Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(4), pages 921-43, June.
- Bikhchandani, Sushil, 1988. "Reputation in repeated second-price auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 97-119, October.
- Parreiras Sergio O., 2006. "Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-19, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.