Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case
AbstractI study affiliated, pure common-value auctions with ex-ante asymmetric buyers. For the two-buyer case I characterize and prove uniqueness of the equilibrium of hybrid auctions where the payment is a weighted average of the highest and second-highest bids. A recursive method to explicitly compute the equilibrium is presented. It is shown that any hybrid auction yields at least as much revenue as the first-price auction. In particular, the equilibrium of the second-price auction, obtained in the limit by letting the weight of the highest bid go to zero, revenue-dominates the first-price auction.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by De Gruyter in its journal The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 6 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (December)
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Web page: http://www.degruyter.com
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- Bernard Lebrun, 2008. "First-Price, Second-Price, and English Auctions with Resale," Working Papers 2008_06, York University, Department of Economics.
- Fong, Yuk-fai & Garrett, Daniel F., 2010.
"Bidding in a possibly common-value auction,"
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Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 494-501, November.
- Fong, Yuk-fai & Garrett, Daniel, 2010. "Bidding in a Possibly Common-Value Auction," Open Access publications from University of Toulouse 1 Capitole http://neeo.univ-tlse1.fr, University of Toulouse 1 Capitole.
- Harrison Cheng & Guofu Tan, 2010. "Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 253-290, October.
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