# Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale

## Author Info

• Harrison Cheng

()

• Guofu Tan

()

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## Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-009-0505-6

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## Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 45 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 253-290

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:45:y:2010:i:1:p:253-290

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## Related research

Keywords: Common-value auctions; Private-value auctions; Resale; Revenue ranking; Regularity condition; Submodularity; Supermodularity; Single-crossing condition; D4; D8; L1;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing
• D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
• L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance

## References

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1. Börgers Tilman M & McQuade Timothy, 2007. "Information-Invariant Equilibria of Extensive Games," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 1-31, December.
2. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-819, November.
3. Stephen Morris & Dirk Bergemann, 2004. "Robust Mechanism Design," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm380, Yale School of Management.
4. Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2004. "All equilibria of the Vickrey auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 170-177, January.
5. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Discussion Papers 447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
6. Lizzeri, Alessandro & Persico, Nicola, 2000. "Uniqueness and Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions with a Reserve Price," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 83-114, January.
7. Williams, Steven R., 1987. "Efficient performance in two agent bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 154-172, February.
8. Isa Hafalir & Vijay Krishna, 2008. "Asymmetric Auctions with Resale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 87-112, March.
9. Parreiras Sergio O., 2006. "Affiliated Common Value Auctions with Differential Information: The Two Bidder Case," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-19, December.
10. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Milgrom, Paul R. & Weber, Robert J., 1983. "Competitive bidding and proprietary information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 161-169, April.
11. Paul Klemperer, 1997. "Auctions with Almost Common Values: The Wallet Game and its Applications," Economics Series Working Papers 1998-W03, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
12. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721.
13. Gustavo E. Rodriguez, 2000. "First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 413-432.
14. Johannes H�rner & Julian Jamison, 2008. "Sequential Common-Value Auctions with Asymmetrically Informed Bidders," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(2), pages 475-498.
15. Gupta, Madhurima & Lebrun, Bernard, 1999. "First price auctions with resale," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 181-185, August.
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## Citations

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Cited by:
1. Cheng, Harrison, 2011. "Auctions with resale and bargaining power," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 300-308.
2. Lebrun, Bernard, 2012. "Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 731-751.
3. Gábor Virág, 2013. "First-price auctions with resale: the case of many bidders," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 52(1), pages 129-163, January.
4. Christian Ewerhart, 2013. "Regular type distributions in mechanism design and $$\rho$$ -concavity," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 591-603, August.
5. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
6. Peter Postl, 2013. "Efficiency versus optimality in procurement," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 425-472, June.
7. Zhang, Jun & Wang, Ruqu, 2013. "Optimal mechanism design with resale via bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2096-2123.
8. David Malueg & Ram Orzach, 2012. "Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 219-254, May.

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