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First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness

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  • Gustavo E. Rodriguez

    ()
    (Wagner College, Staten Island, New York 10301, USA)

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    Abstract

    I study monotonicity and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in a two-person first price auction with affiliated signals. Existing results establish uniqueness within the class of non-decreasing bidding strategies. I show that there is an effectively unique Nash equilibrium within the class of piecewise monotone strategies. The main result is that in equilibrium, the strategies must be strictly increasing within the support of winning bids. This result provides the missing link for the analysis of uniqueness in two-person first price auctions. The analysis applies to asymmetric environments as well and does not require risk neutrality.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

    Volume (Year): 29 (2000)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 413-432

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:3:p:413-432

    Note: Received: August 1997/Last revision: March 2000
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    Related research

    Keywords: auctions; monotonicity; uniqueness.;

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    Cited by:
    1. Todd R. Kaplan & Shmuel Zamir, 2014. "Advances in Auctions," Discussion Paper Series dp662, The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Philip J. Reny & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(4), pages 1105-1125, 07.
    3. David Malueg & Ram Orzach, 2012. "Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 219-254, May.
    4. Harrison Cheng & Guofu Tan, 2010. "Asymmetric common-value auctions with applications to private-value auctions with resale," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 253-290, October.
    5. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Moreira, Humberto, 2006. "First-price auctions without affiliation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 1-7, April.

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