Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Was the Great Depression a low-level equilibrium?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dagsvik, John
  • Jovanovic, Boyan

Abstract

Was the Great Depression the outcome of a massive coordination failure? Or was it a unique equilibrium response to adverse shocks? More generally, do aggregates fluctuate partly because agents occasionally settle on inferior, low-level equilibria? These questions lie at the heart of the current disagreement over how one should view business cycles. This paper estimates an employment model with monetary and real shocks. In one region of the parameter-space the model yields uniqueness, while in the other it yields up to three equilibria. When more than one equilibrium exists, a selection rule is needed. The equilibrium selection rule that we use has a Markovian structure, but the money supply is denied a coordination role -- it can not affect the choice of the equilibrium point. The global maximum likelihood estimates lie in the uniqueness region, implying that instead of being a low-level, coordination-failure equilibrium, the Depression era was caused by movements in fundamentals only. This result held for each of the three subperiods (since 1900) for which the estimation was done, but the estimates are imprecise and the conclusions that we draw from them are tentative. The paper also computes the local maxima in the region of multiplicity, and here some of our estimates indicate that the years 1932 and 1933 would have exhibited low level equilibria had more than one equilibrium existed.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-45F62TN-2M/2/838b8dccc2b652853dc4767f51c23e79
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 38 (1994)
Issue (Month): 9 (December)
Pages: 1711-1729

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:38:y:1994:i:9:p:1711-1729

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. G J Bratsiotis & W Robinson, 2002. "Economic Fundamentals and Self-Fulfilling Crises: Some Evidence from Mexico," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0214, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  2. Christiano, Lawrence J. & G. Harrison, Sharon, 1999. "Chaos, sunspots and automatic stabilizers," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 3-31, August.
  3. Cornell, Christopher M. & Solomon, Raphael H., 2007. "Are currency crises low-state equilibria?: An empirical, three-interest-rate model," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 489-504.
  4. Brock,W.A. & Durlauf,S.N., 2005. "Social interactions and macroeconomics," Working papers 5, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  5. Bratsiotis, George J. & Robinson, Wayne, 2004. "Economic fundamentals and self-fulfilling crises: further evidence from Mexico," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 595-613, June.
  6. Alberto Bisin & Andrea Moro & Giorgio Topa, 2011. "The Empirical Content of Models with Multiple Equilibria in Economies with Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 17196, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Optimal fiscal policy under multiple equilibria," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(8), pages 1359-1377, November.
  8. Huberto M. Ennis & Todd Keister, 2003. "Aggregate demand management with multiple equilibria," Working Paper 03-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  9. Jeanne, Olivier, 1997. "Are currency crises self-fulfilling?: A test," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(3-4), pages 263-286, November.
  10. Christopher M. Cornell & Raphael H. Solomon, 2006. "Are Currency Crises Low-State Equilibria? An Empirical, Three-Interest-Rate Model," Working Papers 06-5, Bank of Canada.
  11. Ratti, Ronald A. & Seo, Jeonghee, 2003. "Multiple equilibria and currency crisis: evidence for Korea," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(5), pages 681-696, October.
  12. Ozkaya, Ata, 2013. "The Domestic Debt Intolerance and Bad Equilibrium: An Empirical Default Model," GIAM Working Papers 13-1, Galatasaray University Economic Research Center.
  13. Michael Chui, 2002. "Leading indicators of balance-of-payments crises: a partial review," Bank of England working papers 171, Bank of England.
  14. Russell Cooper & Joao Ejarque, 1995. "Financial Intermediation and The Great Depression: A Multiple Equilibrium Interpretation," NBER Working Papers 5130, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:38:y:1994:i:9:p:1711-1729

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.