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The Empirical Content of Models with Multiple Equilibria

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Bisin
  • Andrea Moro
  • Giorgio Topa

    (Microeconomic and Regional Studies Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

Abstract

We consider a generic environment with (potentially) multiple equilibria and analyze conditions for identification of the structural parameters. We then study conditions that allow for the estimation of both the structural parameters and the “selected equilibrium†. We focus on a “easy to compute†consistent 2-step estimator and use Monte Carlo methods on a model with social interactions to describe its finite sample properties

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Bisin & Andrea Moro & Giorgio Topa, 2006. "The Empirical Content of Models with Multiple Equilibria," 2006 Meeting Papers 660, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed006:660
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dagsvik, John & Jovanovic, Boyan, 1994. "Was the Great Depression a low-level equilibrium?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(9), pages 1711-1729, December.
    2. Jovanovic, Boyan, 1989. "Observable Implications of Models with Multiple Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1431-1437, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alberto Bisin & Thierry Verdier, 2010. "The Economics of Cultural Transmission and Socialization," NBER Working Papers 16512, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    multiple equilibria; identification; structural estimation; montecarlo simulations;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C13 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General - - - Estimation: General
    • C21 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing

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