Can inflation targeting reduce price information asymmetry and alleviate corruptive behavior? Evidence from developing countries

This paper examines the role of inflation targeting as a price signaling mechanism reducing price information asymmetry and potentially reducing incentives for corruptive actions through its direct control on the inflation rate, thus simultaneously increasing institutional quality. The obtained evidence suggests that adopting inflation targeting lowers corruption in a sample of 61 developing countries for the period between 1990 and 2018. Countries that have adopted inflation targeting experience lower corruption levels, as measured by the corruption perceptions (CP) index, controlling for other relevant determinants of corruption identified in the empirical literature, such as inflation, level of income, income distribution, trade openness and the rule of law. This result is sensitive to the type of inflation targeting adopted. Soft (unofficial) inflation targeting has no significant effect on the corruption level, giving support to the claim that strong institutional commitment, accompanied by transparency and constant communication with regards to inflation targets by the central bank, provides an adequate price signaling mechanism. In addition, the analysis provides evidence that an efficient rule of law reduces corruption levels significantly, although its effects are rather modest to support the claims that it can solely lessen corruptive behavior in the sample of developing countries.