Monitoring and sanctioning in the commons: An application to forestry
AbstractWe examine theoretical determinants of monitoring and sanctioning at both the local community level and from external government agents using the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. We then estimate a bivariate probit statistical model to test the theory using data from 100 forests in 14 countries collected by the International Forestry Resources and Institutions (IFRI) research program. Among other things, we find that a right to harvest some portion of the resource is an important determinant of local monitoring and sanctioning. The number of external aid agencies and NGOs is an important determinant of external monitoring and sanctioning.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Ecological Economics.
Volume (Year): 68 (2009)
Issue (Month): 7 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolecon
Monitoring Sanctioning Community forestry;
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