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How does income inequality affect cooperation and punishment in public good settings?

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  • Sebastian Prediger

    (GIGA)

Abstract

In the frame of decentralization reforms in Namibia, local water point associations evolved that have to collect water fees from community members to cover maintenance costs. Enforcement, however, is weak and water point associations have to rely on moral pleas. As a consequence, several users refuse to pay. I test the impact of informal sanction mechanisms on cooperation among water point users in groups with equal and unequal incomes. Interestingly, and in contrast to the vast majority of related studies, cooperation does not increase under the threat of punishment, though the punishment option was frequently used. At individual level I show that while punishments do not affect cooperative behaviour, they provoke counter-punishment. This suggests that peer-sanctioning mechanisms as a means to enforce norm-compliance are not accepted among water point association members. Contribution levels were higher in heterogeneous groups compared with homogenous ones, and both pro-social and anti-social punishments occurred more frequently in homogenous groups. A comparison between different income types further reveals that the poor contribute larger shares of their income than those endowed with higher incomes and that they use punishment as frequently and as vehemently as the better-off, despite higher opportunity costs.

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File URL: https://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/38-2011__prediger.pdf
File Function: First version, 2011
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201138.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
Handle: RePEc:mar:magkse:201138

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Keywords: Income heterogeneity; public goods experiment; peer punishment; anti-social punishment; Namibia;

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. David Dickinson & David Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas. An Experiment with Police Commissioners," Working Papers halshs-00996511, HAL.
  2. Weng, Qian & Carlsson, Fredrik, 2013. "Cooperation in teams: the role of identity, punishment and endowment distribution," Working Papers in Economics 551, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  3. David L. Dickinson & Daivd Masclet & Marie Claire Villeval, 2014. "Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment with Police Commissioners," Working Papers 14-02, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
  4. Dickinson, David & Masclet, David & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2014. "Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment with Police Commissioners," IZA Discussion Papers 8218, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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