IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/rmm/journl/v3y2012i54.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Coevolving Relationships between Political Science and Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Elinor Ostrom

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

During the last 50 years, at least four interdisciplinary developments have occurred at the boundaries of political science and economics that have affected the central questions that both political scientists and economists ask, the empirical evidence amassed as a new foundation for understanding political economies, and new questions for future research. These include: (1) the Public Choice Approach, (2) the Governance of the Commons debate, (3) New Institutional Economics, and (4) Behavioral Approaches to Explaining Human Actions. In this short essay, I briefly review the challenges that these approaches have brought to political science and some of the general findings stimulated by these approaches before identifying some of the major issues on the contemporary agenda.

Suggested Citation

  • Elinor Ostrom, 2012. "Coevolving Relationships between Political Science and Economics," Rationality, Markets and Morals, Frankfurt School Verlag, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, vol. 3(54), May.
    • Handle: RePEc:rmm:journl:v:3:y:2012:i:54
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.rmm-journal.de/downloads/Article_Ostrom.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul R. Milgrom & Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast*, 1990. "The Role Of Institutions In The Revival Of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, And The Champagne Fairs," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 1-23, March.
    2. Martin Sefton & Robert Shupp & James M. Walker, 2007. "The Effect Of Rewards And Sanctions In Provision Of Public Goods," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(4), pages 671-690, October.
    3. Coleman, Eric A. & Steed, Brian C., 2009. "Monitoring and sanctioning in the commons: An application to forestry," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(7), pages 2106-2113, May.
    4. Arthur T. Denzau & Douglass C. North, 1994. "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(1), pages 3-31, February.
    5. Ostrom, Elinor & Walker, James & Gardner, Roy, 1992. "Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 404-417, June.
    6. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Chennat Gopalakrishnan (ed.), Classic Papers in Natural Resource Economics, chapter 9, pages 178-203, Palgrave Macmillan.
    7. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    8. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    9. Sten Anttila & Charlotta Stern, 2005. "The Voluntary Provision of Snowmobile Trails on Private Land in Sweden," Rationality and Society, , vol. 17(4), pages 453-474, November.
    10. Teske, Paul & Schneider, Mark & Mintrom, Michael & Best, Samuel, 1993. "Establishing The Micro Foundations of a Macro Theory: Information, Movers, and the Competitive Local Market for Public Goods," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 702-713, September.
    11. Gintis, Herbert, 2000. "Beyond Homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 311-322, December.
    12. Miller,Gary J., 1992. "Managerial Dilemmas," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521372817.
    13. H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62(2), pages 124-124.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bruno S. Frey & Lasse Steiner, 2012. "Political Economy: Success or Failure?," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 6(3), September.
    2. Barbashin, Maksim, 2014. "Методологические Возможности “Блумингтонской Школы”: И Перспективы Развития Современного Неоинституционализма [The Formation of the “Bloomington School”: Methodological Opportunities and Perspectiv," MPRA Paper 82034, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Jérôme Ballet & Emmanuel Petit & Delphine Pouchain, 2018. "What mainstream economics should learn from the ethics of care," Post-Print hal-02145302, HAL.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Darcy W E Allen, 2020. "When Entrepreneurs Meet:The Collective Governance of New Ideas," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number q0269.
    2. Fischer, Maria-Elisabeth & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sadrieh, Abdolkarim, 2004. "An intergenerational common pool resource experiment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 811-836, September.
    3. Casari, Marco & Plott, Charles R., 2003. "Decentralized management of common property resources: experiments with a centuries-old institution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 217-247, June.
    4. Gebreegziabher, Zenebe & Mekonnen, Alemu & Gebremedhin, Berhanu & Beyene, Abebe D., 2021. "Determinants of success of community forestry: Empirical evidence from Ethiopia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    5. Tarui, Nori & Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen & Ellis, Greg, 2008. "Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 37-51, January.
    6. Carpenter, Jeffrey P., 2007. "Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 31-51, July.
    7. Leibbrandt, Andreas & López-Pérez, Raúl & Spiegelman, Eli, 2023. "Reciprocal, but inequality averse as well? Mixed motives for punishment and reward," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 210(C), pages 91-116.
    8. van Soest, Daan & Stoop, Jan & Vyrastekova, Jana, 2016. "Toward a delineation of the circumstances in which cooperation can be sustained in environmental and resource problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 1-13.
    9. Kovac Mitja & Elkanawati Amira & Gjikolli Vita & Vandenberghe Ann-Sophie, 2020. "The Covid-19 pandemic: collective action and European public policy under stress," Central European Journal of Public Policy, Sciendo, vol. 14(2), pages 47-59, December.
    10. Bodo Sturm & Joachim Weimann, 2006. "Experiments in Environmental Economics and Some Close Relatives," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 419-457, July.
    11. Gangadharan, Lata & Nikiforakis, Nikos & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2017. "Normative conflict and the limits of self-governance in heterogeneous populations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 143-156.
    12. Andreas Leibbrandt & Raúl López-Pérez, 2014. "Different carrots and different sticks: do we reward and punish differently than we approve and disapprove?," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(1), pages 95-118, January.
    13. Torsten Heinrich & Henning Schwardt, 2013. "Institutional Inertia and Institutional Change in an Expanding Normal-Form Game," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-28, August.
    14. Elinor Ostrom & Harini Nagendra, 2007. "Tenure alone is not sufficient: monitoring is essential," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 8(3), pages 175-199, September.
    15. Villena, Mauricio G. & Zecchetto, Franco, 2011. "Subject-specific performance information can worsen the tragedy of the commons: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 330-347, June.
    16. Ostrom, Elinor, 2006. "The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 149-163, October.
    17. Javier Aliaga Lordemann, 2021. "Experimental Field Evidence of Common Pool Resources: The Water Judge in Bolivia," Development Research Working Paper Series 01/2021, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
    18. Nikos Nikiforakis & Dirk Engelmann, 2008. "Feuds in the Laboratory? A Social Dilemma Experiment," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1058, The University of Melbourne.
    19. Nikiforakis, Nikos & Noussair, Charles N. & Wilkening, Tom, 2012. "Normative conflict and feuds: The limits of self-enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 797-807.
    20. Castillo, Daniel & Saysel, Ali Kerem, 2005. "Simulation of common pool resource field experiments: a behavioral model of collective action," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 420-436, November.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rmm:journl:v:3:y:2012:i:54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Friederike Pförtner (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/hfbfide.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.