Regulation with wage bargaining
AbstractIn many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. In this paper, we study optimal regulation in a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining at the firm level. A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is considerable, is that incentives for cost efficiency should be stronger than in the standard case in which wages do not depend on the regulatory regime. Copyright 2003 Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 113 (2003)
Issue (Month): 487 (04)
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Other versions of this item:
- J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
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