Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Delegation and R&D Spending: Evidence from Italy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jakub Kastl

    (Stanford University)

  • David Martimort

    (Toulouse School of Economics)

  • Salvatore Piccolo

    ()
    (Toulouse School of Economics, University of Naples and CSEF)

Abstract

We use data from the Italian manufacturing industry to document a positive relation- ship between delegation of decisions within organizations and involvement in research and development. This positive correlation is robust to controlling for the determi- nants of R&D within firms such as the level of human capital, capital intensity, sec- toral and regional effects and to using different measures of R&D. We also investigate the determinants of delegation in our sample. We find a positive correlation between ownership concentration and delegation, which goes against the findings of Shleifer and Vishny (1986). We also find that variables found as important determinants of delegation in French manufacturing by Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007) do not appear important in our sample, and some even exhibit qualita- tively opposite effect. These disparities can perhaps be explained by differences in the studied samples and observed variables, and call for further studies of cross-country differences.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.csef.it/WP/wp192.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy in its series CSEF Working Papers with number 192.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2008
Date of revision: 17 Oct 2009
Publication status: Published in Journal of Industrial Economics, 2013, 61, pp. 84–107
Handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:192

Contact details of provider:
Postal: I-80126 Napoli
Phone: +39 081 - 675372
Fax: +39 081 - 675372
Email:
Web page: http://www.csef.it/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: R&D; Delegation; Ownership Concentration; Asymmetric Information;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Zilibotti, Fabrizio & Griffith, Rachel & Aghion, Philippe & Acemoglu, Daron, 2010. "Vertical Integration and Technology: Theory and Evidence," Scholarly Articles 4554219, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  2. Guiso, Luigi & Sapienza, Paola & Zingales, Luigi, 2000. "The Role of Social Capital In Financial Development," CEPR Discussion Papers 2383, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Patrick Gonz�lez, 2004. "Investment and Screening Under Asymmetric Endogenous Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 502-519, Autumn.
  5. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2006. "Technology, information and the decentralization of the firm," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 778, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Jean Tirole, 1985. "Procurement and Renegotiation," Working papers 362, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  7. George P. Baker & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2003. "Make Versus Buy in Trucking: Asset Ownership, Job Design, and Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 551-572, June.
  8. Raghuram Rajan & Julie Wulf, 2003. "The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies," NBER Working Papers 9633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Martimort, David & Piccolo, Salvatore, 2007. "Resale price maintenance under asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 315-339, April.
  10. La Porta, Rafael, et al, 1997. "Trust in Large Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 333-38, May.
  11. Benjamin F. Blair & Tracy R. Lewis, 1994. "Optimal Retail Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(2), pages 284-296, Summer.
  12. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 511-28, June.
  13. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
  14. Baron, David P & Besanko, David, 1992. "Information, Control, and Organizational Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(2), pages 237-75, Summer.
  15. Bester, Helmut & Krahmer, Daniel, 2007. "Delegation and Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 6042, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Katz, Michael L., 1989. "Vertical contractual relations," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 655-721 Elsevier.
  17. Timothy F. Bresnahan & Erik Brynjolfsson & Lorin M. Hitt, 2002. "Information Technology, Workplace Organization, And The Demand For Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 339-376, February.
  18. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June.
  19. Gal-Or, Esther, 1991. "Vertical Restraints with Incomplete Information," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(5), pages 503-16, September.
  20. John Bound & Clint Cummins & Zvi Griliches & Bronwyn H. Hall & Adam B. Jaffe, 1982. "Who Does R&D and Who Patents?," NBER Working Papers 0908, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • John Bound & Clint Cummins & Zvi Griliches & Bronwyn H. Hall & Adam B. Jaffe, 1984. "Who Does R&D and Who Patents?," NBER Chapters, in: R & D, Patents, and Productivity, pages 21-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "On the Management of Innovation," IDEI Working Papers 36, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  22. Audretsch, David B & Vivarelli, Marco, 1996. " Firms Size and R&D Spillovers: Evidence from Italy," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 249-58, June.
  23. Massimo G. Colombo & Marco Delmastro, 2004. "Delegation of Authority In Business Organizations: An Empirical Test," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 53-80, 03.
  24. Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen & Nick Bloom, 2008. "Measuring And Explaining Decentralization Across Firms And Countries," 2008 Meeting Papers 246, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  25. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "The Management of Innovation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 1185-1209, November.
  26. Archibugi, Daniele & Cesaratto, Sergio & Sirilli, Giorgio, 1991. "Sources of innovative activities and industrial organization in Italy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 299-313, August.
  27. Acs, Zoltan J & Audretsch, David B, 1988. "Innovation in Large and Small Firms: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 678-90, September.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bloom, Nicholas & Sadun, Raffaella & Van Reenen, John, 2009. "The Organization of Firms Across Countries," CEPR Discussion Papers 7338, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Catherine Thomas, 2011. "Too Many Products: Decentralized Decision Making in Multinational Firms," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 280-306, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sef:csefwp:192. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lia Ambrosio).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.