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Hierarchical organization and incentives

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  • Caillaud, B.
  • Jullien, B.
  • Picard, P.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-3VW8NC3-W/2/ddf5d70d2f68dade81af6cc379b8178f
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 40 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3-5 (April)
Pages: 687-695

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:40:y:1996:i:3-5:p:687-695

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

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References

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  1. Tirole, J., 1993. "The Internal Organization of Government," Working papers 93-11, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  2. Perez-Castrillo, J.D. & Macho-Stadler, I., 1992. "Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazad Environment," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 179.92, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  4. Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design," Discussion Papers 1135, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
  6. Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 181-214, Fall.
  7. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Bolton, 1994. "The firm as a communication network," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9595, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  8. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. Laffont, J.J. & Martimort, D., 1995. "Collusion and Delegation," Papers 95.397, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  10. Martimort, David, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April.
  11. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September.
  12. repec:fth:geneec:92.06 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Bolton, Patrick & Farrell, Joseph, 1990. "Decentralization, Duplication, and Delay," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 803-26, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Bonilla, Jorge & Coria, Jessica & Sterner, Thomas, 2012. "Synergies and Trade-offs between Climate and Local Air Pollution: Policies in Sweden," Working Papers in Economics 529, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  2. Mary-Françoise RENARD & Philippe DULBECCO, 1999. "Permanency and flexibility of institutions : the role of decentralisation in Chinese economic reforms," Working Papers 199924, CERDI.
  3. Michael Kuhn, . "Delegating Budgets when Agents Care About Autonomy," Discussion Papers 04/10, Department of Economics, University of York.
  4. Lulfesmann, Christoph, 2002. "Central governance or subsidiarity: A property-rights approach to federalism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1379-1397, September.
  5. Kuhn, Michael & Gundlach, Erich, 2006. "Delegating budgets when agents care about autonomy," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 69, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
  6. Christophe Gence-Creux, 2000. "Regulation with a Risk-Averse Principal," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0588, Econometric Society.
  7. Kessler, Anke & Luelfesmann, Christoph & Myers, Gordon M, 2009. "The Architecture of Federations: Constitutions, Bargaining, and Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 7244, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Vickerman, Roger, 2004. "Maintenance incentives under different infrastructure regimes," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 315-322, December.
  9. de Mello, Luiz Jr, 2000. "Fiscal Decentralization and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: A Cross-Country Analysis," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 365-380, February.

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