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ACCHANGE: Building economic models to analyse the performance of air navigation service providers

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  • Blondiau, Thomas
  • Delhaye, Eef
  • Proost, Stef
  • Adler, Nicole

Abstract

This research develops an economic public utility model to analyse the effects of the Single European Sky performance regulation on Air Traffic Control performance. We investigate incentives for air navigation service providers through the development of a high level economic model. This allows us to assess impacts at a strategic level and derive high-level results. The economic model provides insight into the mechanisms through which regulation can drive air traffic management performance improvements, as well as its limitations.

Suggested Citation

  • Blondiau, Thomas & Delhaye, Eef & Proost, Stef & Adler, Nicole, 2016. "ACCHANGE: Building economic models to analyse the performance of air navigation service providers," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 56(PA), pages 19-27.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaitra:v:56:y:2016:i:pa:p:19-27
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jairtraman.2016.02.003
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    Cited by:

    1. Blondiau, Thomas & Glazer, Amihai & Proost, Stef, 2018. "Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining in Europe 11This paper presents results of the ACCHANGE consortium – SESAR project E02.31 – whose support we gratefully acknowledge. We thank the g," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 48-60.
    2. Ivanov, Nikola & Jovanović, Radosav & Fichert, Frank & Strauss, Arne & Starita, Stefano & Babić, Obrad & Pavlović, Goran, 2019. "Coordinated capacity and demand management in a redesigned Air Traffic Management value-chain," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 139-152.
    3. Efthymiou, Marina & Papatheodorou, Andreas, 2018. "Environmental considerations in the Single European Sky: A Delphi approach," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 556-566.
    4. Engin Zeki & Paula Leal de Matos & Kirsteen Purves & Marco Gibellini, 2019. "Business models for flight-centric air traffic control," Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, , vol. 20(4), pages 319-332, December.
    5. Adler, Nicole & Delhaye, Eef & Kivel, Adit & Proost, Stef, 2020. "Motivating air navigation service provider performance," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 1053-1069.

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