IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ebl/ecbull/eb-11-00497.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Revenue Equivalence in Sequential Auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Srobonti Chattopadhyay

    (Jawaharlal Nehru University)

  • Rittwik Chatterjee

    (National Institute of Science, Technology and Development Studies)

Abstract

The revenue equivalence theorem is an widely known result in Auction Theory. This note generalize that theorem for the case of Sequential Auctions. Our results show that under a class of Sequential Auction, if an symmetric and increasing equilibrium bidding strategy exists, then the revenue equivalence still holds for that class of Sequential Auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Srobonti Chattopadhyay & Rittwik Chatterjee, 2012. "Revenue Equivalence in Sequential Auctions," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1272-1281.
    • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00497
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2012/Volume32/EB-12-V32-I2-P121.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paul Klemperer, 2004. "Auctions: Theory and Practice," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number auction1.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Robert Zeithammer, 2019. "Soft Floors in Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4204-4221, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Estrella Alonso & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano & Juan Tejada, 2020. "Mixed Mechanisms for Auctioning Ranked Items," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(12), pages 1-26, December.
    2. Li, Zhen & Kuo, Ching-Chung, 2011. "Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 215(3), pages 721-729, December.
    3. Shigeharu Okajima & Hiroko Okajima, 2016. "Impact of environmental regulation and the 2011 earthquake on the Japanese electricity industry," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 49(2), pages 223-249, April.
    4. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2014. "An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(2), pages 422-466.
    5. Isa Hafalir & Onur Kesten & Katerina Sherstyuk & Cong Tao, 2023. "When Speed is of Essence: Perishable Goods Auctions," Working Papers 202310, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
    6. Condorelli, Daniele, 2013. "Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 582-591.
    7. Onur A. Koska & Ilke Onur & Frank Stähler, 2018. "The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 125(2), pages 107-136, October.
    8. Elbittar, Alexander, 2009. "Impact of valuation ranking information on bidding in first-price auctions: A laboratory study," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 75-85, January.
    9. Jung, Kyu-Chul & Kim, Kyoo H., 2005. "Revenue and optimality in unequal-sized share auctions," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 177-190.
    10. Sweeting, Andrew & Bhattacharya, Vivek, 2015. "Selective entry and auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 189-207.
    11. Li, Yunan, 2017. "Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 225-253.
    12. Arozamena, Leandro & Weinschelbaum, Federico, 2011. "On favoritism in auctions with entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 265-267, March.
    13. Menezes, Flavio M. & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2006. "Corruption and auctions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 97-108, February.
    14. Rey, Patrick & Salant, David, 2017. "Allocating essential inputs," TSE Working Papers 17-820, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jun 2019.
    15. Anatolitis, Vasilios & Welisch, Marijke, 2017. "Putting renewable energy auctions into action – An agent-based model of onshore wind power auctions in Germany," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 394-402.
    16. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Søreide, Tina, 2017. "An economic analysis of debarment," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 36-49.
    17. Gonzalo Cisternas & Nicolás Figueroa, 2015. "Sequential procurement auctions and their effect on investment decisions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 824-843, October.
    18. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    19. Jing Chen & Silvio Micali, 2016. "Leveraging Possibilistic Beliefs in Unrestricted Combinatorial Auctions," Games, MDPI, vol. 7(4), pages 1-19, October.
    20. Blackstone, Erwin A. & Buck, Andrew J. & Hakim, Simon, 2004. "Privatizing adoption and foster care: Applying auction and market solutions," Children and Youth Services Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(11), pages 1033-1049, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sequential Auction; Revenue Equivalence;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-11-00497. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: John P. Conley (email available below). General contact details of provider: .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.