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Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality In Practice

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  • Gregory Dees, J.
  • Cramton, Peter C.

Abstract

From a traditional moral point of view, business practitioners often seem overly concerned about the behavior of their peers in deciding how they ought to act. We propose to account for this concern by introducing a mutual trust perspective, where moral obligations are grounded in a sense of trust that others will abide by the same rules. When grounds for trust are absent, the obligation is weakened. We illustrate this perspective by examining the widespread ambivalence with regard to deception about one's settlement preferences in negotiation. On an abstract level, such deception generally seems undesirable, though in many individual cases it is condoned, even admired as shrewd bargaining. Because of the difficulty in verifying someone's settlement preferences, it is hard to establish a basis for trusting the revelations of the other party, especially in competitive negotiations with relative strangers.Brer Rabbit had got himself caught by Brer Fox and was well on his way to becoming evening dinner. Brer Rabbit was in a great deal of deep trouble.There didn’t seem much he could do about this one, but he didn’t seem concerned at all at being the Fox’s dinner. He just said, “Brer Fox I don’t mind if you eat me. But, oh, whatever you do don’t throw me in that briar patch.†Now Brer Fox was surely looking forward to eating his old enemy, but he was mighty curious about Brer Rabbit’s sweating and crying about being thrown into the briar patch.And the more he questioned it the more Brer Rabbit wailed about how much he hated and feared that briar patch.Pretty soon it did seem that Brer Rabbit would rather be eaten than be set among those briars. So Brer Fox threw Brer Rabbit into the heart of the briar patch. Brer Rabbit gleefully scampered away.From the tales of Brer Rabbit

Suggested Citation

  • Gregory Dees, J. & Cramton, Peter C., 1991. "Shrewd Bargaining on the Moral Frontier: Toward a Theory of Morality In Practice," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(2), pages 135-167, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:buetqu:v:1:y:1991:i:02:p:135-167_00
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Boles, Terry L. & Croson, Rachel T. A. & Murnighan, J. Keith, 2000. "Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 235-259, November.
    2. Filipe Sobral & Gazi Islam, 2013. "Ethically Questionable Negotiating: The Interactive Effects of Trust, Competitiveness, and Situation Favorability on Ethical Decision Making," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 117(2), pages 281-296, October.
    3. Julie A. Nelson, 2012. "Poisoning the Well, or How Economic Theory Damages Moral Imagination," GDAE Working Papers 12-07, GDAE, Tufts University.
    4. Cramton, Peter C. & Dees, J. Gregory, 1993. "Promoting Honesty in Negotiation: An Exercise in Practical Ethics," Business Ethics Quarterly, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(4), pages 359-394, October.
    5. Lina Zhou & Yu-wei Sung & Dongsong Zhang, 2013. "Deception Performance in Online Group Negotiation and Decision Making: The Effects of Deception Experience and Deception Skill," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 153-172, January.
    6. Mara Olekalns & Philip Smith, 2007. "Loose with the Truth: Predicting Deception in Negotiation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 76(2), pages 225-238, December.
    7. SimanTov-Nachlieli, Ilanit & Har-Vardi, Liron & Moran, Simone, 2020. "When negotiators with honest reputations are less (and more) likely to be deceived," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 68-84.
    8. Hillie Aaldering & Alfred Zerres & Wolfgang Steinel, 2020. "Constituency Norms Facilitate Unethical Negotiation Behavior Through Moral Disengagement," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 29(5), pages 969-991, October.
    9. Nelson, Julie A., 2012. "Poisoning the Well, or How Economic Theory Damages Moral Imagination," Working Papers 179107, Tufts University, Global Development and Environment Institute.
    10. Nelson, J.A., 2013. "Ethics and the economist: What climate change demands of us," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 145-154.
    11. Sherwood, Charles, 2022. "A lie is a lie: the ethics of lying in business negotiations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 113331, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    12. Denise Fleck & Roger J. Volkema & Sergio Pereira, 2016. "Dancing on the Slippery Slope: The Effects of Appropriate Versus Inappropriate Competitive Tactics on Negotiation Process and Outcome," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 25(5), pages 873-899, September.
    13. Volkema, Roger J., 2004. "Demographic, cultural, and economic predictors of perceived ethicality of negotiation behavior: A nine-country analysis," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 69-78, January.
    14. Nohe, Christoph & Hüffmeier, Joachim & Bürkner, Paul & Mazei, Jens & Sondern, Dominik & Runte, Antonia & Sieber, Franziska & Hertel, Guido, 2022. "Unethical choice in negotiations: A meta-analysis on gender differences and their moderators," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    15. Mara Olekalns & Carol Kulik & Lin Chew, 2014. "Sweet Little Lies: Social Context and the Use of Deception in Negotiation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 120(1), pages 13-26, March.
    16. Peter Cramton & J. Gregory Dees, 1995. "Deception and Mutual Trust: A Reply to Strudler," Papers of Peter Cramton 95beq, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
    17. Mara Olekalns & Philip Smith, 2009. "Mutually Dependent: Power, Trust, Affect and the Use of Deception in Negotiation," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 85(3), pages 347-365, March.
    18. Koning, Lukas & Steinel, Wolfgang & Beest, Ilja van & Dijk, Eric van, 2011. "Power and deception in ultimatum bargaining," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-42, May.
    19. Yu Yang & David De Cremer & Chao Wang, 2017. "How Ethically Would Americans and Chinese Negotiate? The Effect of Intra-cultural Versus Inter-cultural Negotiations," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 659-670, October.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • M29 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Other

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