Deception and Retribution in Repeated Ultimatum Bargaining
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.
Volume (Year): 83 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
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