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Calls and Couples: Communication, Connections, Joint-Consumption and Transfer Prices

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  • Ana Paula Martins

    (Faculdade de Ciencias Economicas e Empresariais, Universidade Catolica)

Abstract

The article explores joint consumption equilibrium environments. It illustrates network formation through one-to-one directional synapses. Family (couple) arrangements, spontaneously generated under a decentralized general equilibrium price system are suggested - involving link and direction-specific transfer prices along with standard resource one. The research also inspects preference characteristics able to generate monogamous choices and assortative matching and mating. Assortative mating (and income pooling) is clarified, related to exclusivity or taste-for unicity at the utility level with respect to shared good, with optimal assignment connected to equalization of the marginal benefit of the match - adequately defined - across individuals in the economy. Contrast with a multiple external effect good - one-to-many communication; (or) shared by a fixed number of, more than two, individuals; common property - and with a pure public good is also provided. If paired consumption with end-point specificity generates (or may generate), under reasonable assumptions, a unique decentralized equilibrium solution, supporting an efficient allocation, multiple agent sharing among more than two individuals and individual types requires, along with excludability, perfect differentiation of a larger number of consumption - partnership - roles.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Society for AEF in its journal Annals of Economics and Finance.

Volume (Year): 13 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 237-281

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Handle: RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2012:v:13:i:2:martins

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Related research

Keywords: Shared goods; Joint consumption; Cost-sharing; Communications; Call; Linkage; Network nodes; Synapses; Matching; (Assortative) Mating; Couple goods; Family formation; Dowry; Transfer prices; Theory of the firm;

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