Bargaining Around the Hearth
AbstractIn "Unpacking the Household: Informal Property Rights Around the Hearth" (Yale Law Journal, 2006) Robert Ellickson argues that as long as members of a household expect their relationship to continue, norms, rather than law, will determine allocations among them. More specifically, Ellickson argues that in "midgame" household members either ignore the "endgame" completely or, if they do take endgame considerations into account, the relevant endgame considerations are determined by norms rather than by law. This paper examines the fit between Ellickson's claims and four bargaining models that economists have used to understand interactions within household and families.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13142.
Date of creation: May 2007
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Note: LE LS
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
- J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
- K36 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Family and Personal Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-HPE-2007-06-11 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2007-06-11 (Law & Economics)
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