Group Formation and Governance
AbstractThis paper studies the impact of the governance of a group, whether be it unanimity, simple majority or qualified majority, on its (endogenously derived) size, composition, and inclination to change the status quo. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that not only unanimity might favor the formation of larger groups than majority, but also a change of status quo.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 13 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (08)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
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Other versions of this item:
- Ludovic Renou, 2007. "Group formation and governance," Discussion Papers in Economics 07/07, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
- Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Group formation and governance," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/15, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, revised Nov 2008.
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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