A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Stable Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities
AbstractWe propose a class of sharing rules for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for partition function games with externalities. We show that this class of sharing rules is characterized by three axioms: coalitional efficiency, additivity and anonimity which are adapted to the context of partition function games. The sharing rules stabilize, in the sense of d'Aspremont et al. (1983), the coalition which generates the highest global welfare among the set of potentially internally stable coalitions. The new class of sharing rules is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition formation (outsiders benefit from the expansion of the coalition) and which therefore often suffer from free-riding.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Bath, Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 32513.
Date of creation: Oct 2012
Date of revision:
resources; economic growth; renewable energy; natural; environmental policy;
Other versions of this item:
- Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael & Mallozzi, Lina, 2011. "A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Stable Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities," Working Papers, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management 2011/08, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
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