# Elsevier

# Mathematical Social Sciences

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**Series handle:**repec:eee:matsoc

**ISSN:**0165-4896

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### 2007, Volume 54, Issue 1

**35-58 A solution for bargaining problems with coalition structure***by*Bergantinos, G. & Casas-Mendez, B. & Fiestras-Janeiro, M.G. & Vidal-Puga, J.J.**59-70 "I want to be a J!": Liberalism in group identification problems***by*Nicolas, Houy**71-89 Bounded rationality and repeated network formation***by*Beal, Sylvain & Querou, Nicolas**90-105 The arbitrage pricing theorem with incomplete preferences***by*Kelsey, David & Yalcin, Erkan**106-114 A note on spanning with options***by*Galvani, Valentina

### 2007, Volume 53, Issue 3

**213-231 A model of political competition with activists applied to the elections of 1989 and 1995 in Argentina***by*Schofield, Norman & Cataife, Guido**232-238 Cases where the Penrose limit theorem does not hold***by*Lindner, Ines & Owen, Guillermo**239-254 Minimally manipulable anonymous social choice functions***by*Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton**255-258 Arrovian aggregation for preferences over sets***by*Kutlu, Levent**259-273 Appraising diversity with an ordinal notion of similarity: An axiomatic approach***by*Bervoets, Sebastian & Gravel, Nicolas**274-283 Revealed incomplete preferences under status-quo bias***by*Tapki, Ipek Gursel**284-295 A variant of non-consequentialism and its characterization***by*Iwata, Yukinori**296-313 Time consistent fiscal policies in a Ramsey economy***by*Cellini, Roberto & Lambertini, Luca**314-331 Connectivity, stability and efficiency in a network as an information flow***by*Jun, Tackseung & Kim, Jeong-Yoo**332-334 Archimedean and continuity***by*Karni, Edi

### 2007, Volume 53, Issue 2

**123-133 Sharing beliefs about actions***by*Lo, Kin Chung**134-139 A network formation process converges to the complete collaboration network***by*Okumura, Yasunori**140-149 A characterization of the pseudo-average cost method***by*Larrea, C. & Santos, J.C.**150-163 The dual serial cost-sharing rule***by*Albizuri, M. Josune & Zarzuelo, Jose M.**164-171 Stable set and voting rules***by*Kultti, Klaus & Miettinen, Paavo**172-184 The two-person blocks as a way to emphasize several semivalues***by*Amer, Rafael & Gimenez, Jose Miguel**185-195 A generalized index of employment segregation***by*Chakravarty, Satya R. & Silber, Jacques**196-208 On the evaluation of fit measures for quasi-orders***by*Schrepp, Martin**209-211 A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatibility***by*Nunez, Matias

### 2007, Volume 53, Issue 1

**1-28 On comparing heterogeneous populations: Is there really a conflict between welfarism and a concern for greater equality in living standards?***by*Capeau, Bart & Ooghe, Erwin**29-45 Income inequality, quasi-concavity, and gradual population shifts***by*Bosmans, Kristof**46-52 The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility***by*de Clippel, Geoffroy**53-68 Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities***by*Bochet, Olivier & Sakai, Toyotaka**69-92 Gridline indifference graphs***by*Peterson, Dale**93-105 Consistency indicators for fuzzy choice functions***by*Georgescu, Irina**106-110 A `threshold aggregation' of three-graded rankings***by*Aleskerov, Fuad & Yakuba, Vyacheslav & Yuzbashev, Dmitriy**111-121 Some further characterizations for the forgotten voting rules***by*Houy, Nicolas

### 2006, Volume 52, Issue 3

**223-232 Portfolio inertia under ambiguity***by*Asano, Takao**233-251 A generalized model of commitment***by*Drewianka, Scott**252-271 Identifying reaction functions in differential oligopoly games***by*Lambertini, Luca & Mantovani, Andrea**272-287 Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain***by*Larsson, Bo & Svensson, Lars-Gunnar**288-301 A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel***by*Serrano, Roberto & Shimomura, Ken-Ichi**302-310 Critical agents in networks***by*Gilles, Robert P. & Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Sarangi, Sudipta & Badasyan, Narine

### 2006, Volume 52, Issue 2

**111-130 Investment behavior under ambiguity: The case of pessimistic decision makers***by*Ludwig, Alexander & Zimper, Alexander**131-151 Representation of preferences over a finite scale by a mean operator***by*Grabisch, Michel**152-161 A generalized assignment game***by*Camina, Ester**162-175 Bargaining solutions at work: Qualitative differences in policy implications***by*Gerber, Anke & Upmann, Thorsten**176-196 On the applicability of Marshallian partial-equilibrium analysis***by*Miyake, Mitsunobu**197-209 Modelling dependency in multivariate paired comparisons: A log-linear approach***by*Dittrich, Regina & Francis, Brian & Hatzinger, Reinhold & Katzenbeisser, Walter**210-216 An axiomatization of the generalized Edgeworth-Pareto principle in terms of choice functions***by*Noghin, Vladimir D.**217-221 Chebyshev's Algebraic Inequality and comparative statics under uncertainty***by*Wagener, Andreas

### 2006, Volume 52, Issue 1

**1-14 Supermodularity and risk aversion***by*Quiggin, John & Chambers, Robert G.**15-30 On bounded dominance criteria***by*Ooghe, Erwin & Lambert, Peter**31-48 Vote trading in public elections***by*Hartvigsen, David**49-66 Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox***by*Laffond, G. & Laine, J.**67-76 A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders***by*Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel & Moyouwou, Issofa**77-87 Three-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences***by*Eriksson, Kimmo & Sjostrand, Jonas & Strimling, Pontus**88-98 A new weight scheme for the Shapley value***by*Haeringer, Guillaume**99-108 A note on the Loewenstein-Prelec theory of intertemporal choice***by*al-Nowaihi, Ali & Dhami, Sanjit**109-110 Corrigendum to "A possibility theorem on aggregation over multiple interconnected propositions" [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003), 1-13]***by*List, Christian

### 2006, Volume 51, Issue 3

**247-256 Compromise solutions based on bankruptcy***by*Quant, Marieke & Borm, Peter & Hendrickx, Ruud & Zwikker, Peter**257-273 A category theory approach to derived preference relations in some decision making problems***by*Rozen, Victor & Zhitomirski, Grigori**274-279 Consensus, communication and knowledge: An extension with Bayesian agents***by*Menager, Lucie**280-300 Full surplus extraction by a risk averse seller in correlated environments***by*Menicucci, Domenico**301-310 Mean consumption representation of consumption externalities***by*Noguchi, Mitsunori**311-326 The forgotten decision rules: Majority rules based on difference of votes***by*Llamazares, Bonifacio**327-336 A multigenerational dynamic game of resource extraction***by*Nowak, Andrzej S.

### 2006, Volume 51, Issue 2

**125-152 The propagation of chaos for interacting individuals in a large population***by*Tanabe, Yasuo**153-161 Strategic advertising: The fat-cat effect and stability***by*Beladi, Hamid & Oladi, Reza**162-170 Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and cores in a strategic pure exchange game of bads***by*Hirai, Toshiyuki & Masuzawa, Takuya & Nakayama, Mikio**171-181 A pessimistic approach to the queueing problem***by*Chun, Youngsub**182-191 Maximality with or without binariness: Transfer-type characterizations***by*Alcantud, Jose C.R.**192-200 More on the uniform rule: Characterizations without Pareto optimality***by*Kesten, Onur**201-216 Refinements of Muirhead's Lemma and income inequality***by*Aboudi, Ronny & Thon, Dominique**217-226 An axiomatic characterization for regular semivalues***by*Amer, Rafael & Gimenez, Jose Miguel**227-237 The existence of utility functions for weakly continuous preferences on a Banach space***by*Campion, Maria J. & Candeal, Juan C. & Indurain, Esteban**238-245 A new characterization of the path independent choice functions***by*Danilov, V. & Koshevoy, G.

### 2006, Volume 51, Issue 1

**1-22 Agreement and stochastic independence of belief functions***by*Lo, Kin Chung**23-57 Utility of income as a random function: Behavioral characterization and empirical evidence***by*Dagsvik, John K. & Strom, Steinar & Jia, Zhiyang**58-69 An axiomatic characterization of value judgments relative to a reference point***by*Munnich, Akos**70-80 The linear cost equivalent rule: A solution procedure for heterogeneous joint production problems***by*Arguedas, Carmen & Kranich, Laurence**81-89 Social welfare functions generating social choice rules that are invulnerable to manipulation***by*Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S.**90-106 L S Penrose's limit theorem: Tests by simulation***by*Chang, Pao-Li & Chua, Vincent C.H. & Machover, Moshe**107-116 Super weak isomorphism of extensive games***by*Casajus, Andre**117-123 Properties of the correlational agreement coefficient: A comment to Unlu and Albert (2004)***by*Schrepp, Martin

### 2005, Volume 50, Issue 3

**239-251 Rawlsian maximin, Dutch books, and non-additive expected utility***by*Hougaard, Jens Leth & Keiding, Hans**252-267 Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness***by*Heifetz, Aviad & Pauzner, Ady**268-278 Location choices under quality uncertainty***by*Christou, Charalambos & Vettas, Nikolaos**279-297 The not-quite non-atomic game: Non-emptiness of the core in large production games***by*Flam, Sjur & Owen, Guillermo & Saboya, Martha**298-303 An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf***by*Sotomayor, Marilda**304-317 Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms***by*Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek & Remzi Sanver, M.**318-330 Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games***by*Izquierdo, Josep M. & Llerena, Francesc & Rafels, Carles**331-335 Downsian competition with four parties***by*Sofronidis, Nikolaos Efstathiou**336-341 A note on arbitrage and exogenous collateral***by*Fajardo, Jose

### 2005, Volume 50, Issue 2

**127-147 Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space***by*Cressman, Ross**148-165 Incomplete information, credibility and the core***by*Dutta, Bhaskar & Vohra, Rajiv**166-180 Stakeholders in bilateral conflict***by*Manzini, Paola & Ponsati, Clara**181-201 Nash networks with heterogeneous links***by*Haller, Hans & Sarangi, Sudipta**202-214 A representation for intransitive indifference relations***by*Ozbay, Erkut Yusuf & Filiz, Emel**215-226 Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation***by*Ohseto, Shinji**227-233 A paradoxical Pareto frontier in the cake-cutting context***by*Taylor, Alan D.**234-237 Lorenz dominance for transformed income distributions: A simple proof***by*Damjanovic, Tatiana

### 2005, Volume 50, Issue 1

**1-2 Editorial***by*Laslier, Jean-Francois**3-11 Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random***by*Smorodinsky, Rann**12-23 Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games***by*Bossert, Walter & Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans**24-38 Stable coalitions in a continuous-time model of risk sharing***by*Chade, H. & Taub, B.**39-60 Repeated games with probabilistic horizon***by*Arribas, I. & Urbano, A.**61-82 Preference-based belief operators***by*Asheim, Geir B. & Sovik, Ylva**83-101 Generalized means of jurors' competencies and marginal changes of jury's size***by*Sapir, Luba**102-126 Convexity of oligopoly games without transferable technologies***by*Driessen, Theo S.H. & Meinhardt, Holger I.

### 2005, Volume 49, Issue 3

**245-272 Mathematics of Plott choice functions***by*Danilov, V. & Koshevoy, G.**273-293 History-dependence in a rational addiction model***by*Gavrila, C. & Feichtinger, G. & Tragler, G. & Hartl, R.F. & Kort, P.M.**295-307 Lindahl equilibrium and Schweizer's open club model with semipublic goods***by*ten Raa, Thijs & Gilles, Robert P.**309-325 Implementation in production economies with increasing returns***by*Tian, Guoqiang**327-334 A new proof for Weber's characterization of the random order values***by*Derks, Jean**335-353 Separable discrete preferences***by*Bradley, W. James & Hodge, Jonathan K. & Kilgour, D. Marc**355-365 A note on the characterization of Nash networks***by*Billand, Pascal & Bravard, Christophe

### 2005, Volume 49, Issue 2

**117-141 Increasing uncertainty: a definition***by*Grant, Simon & Quiggin, John**143-151 CEU preferences and dynamic consistency***by*Eichberger, Jurgen & Grant, Simon & Kelsey, David**153-178 Axiomatic structure of k-additive capacities***by*Miranda, P. & Grabisch, M. & Gil, P.**179-199 Coalition-proof Nash allocation in a barter game with multiple indivisible goods***by*Wako, Jun**201-220 Bayesian serial cost sharing***by*Kolpin, Van & Wilbur, Dameon**221-243 Monotonicity and equal-opportunity equivalence in bargaining***by*Nicolo, Antonio & Perea, Andres

### 2005, Volume 49, Issue 1

**1-15 Freedom of choice: the leximax criterion in the infinite case***by*Arlegi, R. & Besada, M. & Nieto, J. & Vazquez, C.**17-37 Escalation and delay in protracted international conflicts***by*Heifetz, Aviad & Segev, Ella**39-53 More likely than unlikely***by*Lo, Kin Chung**55-80 Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation***by*Slikker, Marco & Gilles, Robert P. & Norde, Henk & Tijs, Stef**81-100 Existence and definability of states of the world***by*Tohme, Fernando**101-110 Bargaining power in repeated games***by*Osterdal, Lars Peter**111-116 Faster algorithms for computing power indices in weighted voting games***by*Klinz, Bettina & Woeginger, Gerhard J.

### 2004, Volume 48, Issue 3

**235-250 Some characterizations of non-additive multi-period models***by*Chateauneuf, Alain & Rebille, Yann**251-269 Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond***by*Barbanel, Julius B. & Brams, Steven J.**271-280 Strategyproof cost sharing of a binary good and the egalitarian solution***by*Mutuswami, Suresh**281-314 The Correlational Agreement Coefficient CA(D)--a mathematical analysis of a descriptive goodness-of-fit measure***by*Unlu, Ali & Albert, Dietrich**315-327 Network formation by reinforcement learning: the long and medium run***by*Pemantle, Robin & Skyrms, Brian**329-341 Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games***by*Mihara, H. Reiju**343-361 The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes***by*Merlin, Vincent & Valognes, Fabrice

### 2004, Volume 48, Issue 2

**113-119 Additive representations over actions and acts***by*Karni, Edi**121-138 Social choice and information: the informational structure of uniqueness theorems in axiomatic social theories***by*Kaminski, Marek M.**139-150 Set comparisons in a general domain: the Indirect Utility Criterion***by*Ballester, Miguel A. & de Miguel, Juan R. & Nieto, Jorge**151-182 Responsibility sensitive egalitarianism and optimal linear income taxation***by*Schokkaert, Erik & Van de gaer, Dirk & Vandenbroucke, Frank & Luttens, Roland Iwan**183-192 Consensus functions on tree quasi-orders that satisfy an independence condition***by*McMorris, F. R. & Powers, R. C.**193-206 Characterizations of the value of matrix games***by*Norde, Henk & Voorneveld, Mark**207-221 A power analysis of linear games with consensus***by*Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep**223-233 There is a free lunch after all***by*Liao, Chun-Hsiung & Tauman, Yair

### 2004, Volume 48, Issue 1

**1-9 A Yosida-Hewitt decomposition for totally monotone games***by*Chateauneuf, Alain & Rebille, Yann**11-22 A note on Wakker's Cardinal Coordinate Independence***by*Bouyssou, Denis & Pirlot, Marc**23-35 Indivisible-labor, lotteries and idiosyncratic productivity shocks***by*Maliar, Lilia & Maliar, Serguei**37-53 A group bargaining solution***by*Chae, Suchan & Heidhues, Paul**55-67 Life insurance, precautionary saving and contingent bequest***by*Chang, Fwu-Ranq**69-80 Generalized measures of literacy***by*Dutta, Indranil**81-91 Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: continuum of attributes***by*Feldman, David & Winer, Russell S.**93-101 Separating signaling equilibria under random relations between costs and attributes: discrete attributes***by*Feldman, David**103-108 The Dodgson ranking and the Borda count: a binary comparison***by*Klamler, Christian**109-112 Existence of positive equilibrium price vectors in indivisible goods markets: a note***by*Saitoh, Hiroki

### 2004, Volume 47, Issue 3

**261-273 An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' Rule***by*Majumdar, Dipjyoti**275-287 Representation of effectivity functions by acceptable game forms: a complete characterization***by*Peleg, Bezalel**289-293 How large should a coalition be to manipulate an election?***by*Slinko, Arkadii**295-312 Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment***by*Fiestras-Janeiro, Gloria & Klijn, Flip & Sanchez, Estela**313-325 Egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games***by*Branzei, Rodica & Dimitrov, Dinko & Tijs, Stef**327-348 From poverty measurement to the measurement of downside risk***by*Breitmeyer, Carsten & Hakenes, Hendrik & Pfingsten, Andreas**349-366 Closure systems, implicational systems, overhanging relations and the case of hierarchical classification***by*Domenach, Florent & Leclerc, Bruno**367-387 Existence of trading Nash equilibrium in tariff retaliation models***by*Wong, Siu-kee**389-392 Corrigendum to "Essential alternatives and set-dependent preferences: a corrigendum" [Mathematical Social Sciences 45(2003)121-129]***by*Houy, Nicolas

### 2004, Volume 47, Issue 2

**135-151 The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game***by*Forges, Francoise**153-176 Strategy-proof estimators for simple regression***by*Perote, Javier & Perote-Pena, Juan**177-185 Information is not about measurability***by*Dubra, Juan & Echenique, Federico**187-210 An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings***by*Martinez, Ruth & Masso, Jordi & Neme, Alejandro & Oviedo, Jorge**211-217 A note on gender fairness in matching problems***by*Ozkal-Sanver, Ipek**219-232 Voting power and at-large representation***by*Edelman, Paul H.**233-243 On efficiency, tie-breaking rules and role assignment procedures in evolutionary bargaining***by*Poulsen, Anders U.**245-257 The Talmud rule and the securement of agents' awards***by*Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Villar, Antonio**259-260 Erratum to "Numerical measures of segregation" [Math. Soc. Sci. 42 (2001) 13-29]***by*Hutchens, R.

### 2004, Volume 47, Issue 1

**1-20 Coherent inequality views: linear invariant measures reconsidered***by*Ebert, Udo**21-36 Single crossing Lorenz curves and inequality comparisons***by*Gajdos, Thibault**37-49 L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases***by*Lindner, Ines & Machover, Moshe**51-68 On two new social choice correspondences***by*Borm, Peter & van den Brink, Rene & Levinsky, Rene & Slikker, Marco**69-85 The effectiveness of weighted scoring rules when pairwise majority rule cycles exist***by*Gehrlein, William V.**87-101 Additive rules in bankruptcy problems and other related problems***by*Bergantinos, Gustavo & Vidal-Puga, Juan J.**103-110 Sustainability, exemption, and the constrained equal awards rule: a note***by*Yeh, Chun-Hsien**111-134 Which acceptable agreements are equilibria?***by*Thoron, Sylvie

### 2003, Volume 46, Issue 3

**243-260 On necessary and sufficient conditions for solvability of game forms***by*Abdou, Joseph & Keiding, Hans**261-265 Some further remark on the core structure of the assignment game***by*Sotomayor, Marilda**267-290 Weak isomorphism of extensive games***by*Casajus, Andre**291-309 Best-reply matching in games***by*Droste, Edward & Kosfeld, Michael & Voorneveld, Mark**311-326 Intransitive indifference and rationalizability of choice functions on general domains***by*Bandyopadhyay, Taradas & Sengupta, Kunal**327-345 Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games***by*Arin, Javier & Kuipers, Jeroen & Vermeulen, Dries**347-354 A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination***by*Woeginger, Gerhard J.**355-356 Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203]***by*Barbera, Salvador & Gerber, Anke

### 2003, Volume 46, Issue 2

**103-144 The presence of lattice theory in discrete problems of mathematical social sciences. Why***by*Monjardet, Bernard**145-148 Existence of stable matchings in some three-sided systems***by*Danilov, V. I.**149-158 On the stable b-matching polytope***by*Fleiner, Tamas**159-192 Walrasian equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities***by*Ma, Jinpeng & Nie, Fusheng**193-205 Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games***by*Holzman, Ron & Law-yone (Lev-tov), Nissan**207-241 On Nash-solvability in pure stationary strategies of finite games with perfect information which may have cycles***by*Boros, E. & Gurvich, V.

### 2003, Volume 46, Issue 1

**1-7 Comonotonic book making and attitudes to uncertainty***by*Kast, Robert & Lapied, Andre**9-19 An amendment to final-offer arbitration***by*Zeng, Dao-Zhi**21-25 Sufficiency in Blackwell's theorem***by*Bielinska-Kwapisz, Agnieszka**27-54 Centrality and power in social networks: a game theoretic approach***by*Gomez, Daniel & Gonzalez-Aranguena, Enrique & Manuel, Conrado & Owen, Guillermo & del Pozo, Monica & Tejada, Juan**55-62 On competitive equilibria with common complementarities***by*Sherstyuk, Katerina**63-80 Computing power indices in weighted multiple majority games***by*Algaba, E. & Bilbao, J. M. & Fernandez Garcia, J. R. & Lopez, J. J.**81-99 Partial derivatives, comparative risk behavior and concavity of utility functions***by*Lajeri-Chaherli, Fatma

### 2003, Volume 45, Issue 3

**249-297 Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey***by*Thomson, William**299-311 Transfer principles and relative inequality aversion a majorization approach***by*Aboudi, Ronny & Thon, Dominique**313-331 Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games***by*Hokari, Toru & Kibris, Ozgur