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Content
2016, Volume 163, Issue C
- 728-774 Bounded memory Folk Theorem
by Barlo, Mehmet & Carmona, Guilherme & Sabourian, Hamid
- 775-785 A test for risk-averse expected utility
by Chambers, Christopher P. & Liu, Ce & Martinez, Seung-Keun
- 786-818 Heterogeneous beliefs and trading inefficiencies
by Branch, William & McGough, Bruce
- 819-825 QWERTY is efficient
by Guimaraes, Bernardo & Pereira, Ana Elisa
- 826-848 Common belief foundations of global games
by Morris, Stephen & Shin, Hyun Song & Yildiz, Muhamet
- 849-888 Optimal sequential delegation
by Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen
- 889-899 Graphical potential games
by Babichenko, Yakov & Tamuz, Omer
- 900-924 Seeking ergodicity in dynamic economies
by Kamihigashi, Takashi & Stachurski, John
- 925-954 Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains
by Mishra, Debasis
- 955-985 Lexicographic beliefs and assumption
by Dekel, Eddie & Friedenberg, Amanda & Siniscalchi, Marciano
2016, Volume 162, Issue C
- 1-20 Entropy, desegregation, and proportional rationing
by Moulin, Hervé
- 21-54 Convergence of best-response dynamics in extensive-form games
by Xu, Zibo
- 55-92 Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard
by Chade, Hector & Kovrijnykh, Natalia
- 93-113 Finite-population evolution with rare mutations in asymmetric games
by Veller, Carl & Hayward, Laura K.
- 114-136 Geographical structure and convergence: A note on geometry in spatial growth models
by Fabbri, Giorgio
- 137-180 A life-cycle model with ambiguous survival beliefs
by Groneck, Max & Ludwig, Alexander & Zimper, Alexander
- 181-194 Existence of equilibria in discontinuous Bayesian games
by He, Wei & Yannelis, Nicholas C.
- 195-208 A behavioral study of “noise” in coordination games
by Mäs, Michael & Nax, Heinrich H.
- 209-236 Power brokers: Middlemen in legislative bargaining
by Iaryczower, Matias & Oliveros, Santiago
- 237-260 Universal interactive preferences
by Ganguli, Jayant & Heifetz, Aviad & Lee, Byung Soo
- 261-304 How to share it out: The value of information in teams
by Gershkov, Alex & Li, Jianpei & Schweinzer, Paul
- 305-351 Goals and bracketing under mental accounting
by Koch, Alexander K. & Nafziger, Julia
- 352-371 Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules
by Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian & Bradley, Richard
- 372-406 A simple model of two-stage choice
by Horan, Sean
- 407-450 Robust virtual implementation under common strong belief in rationality
by Müller, Christoph
2016, Volume 161, Issue C
- 1-36 Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach
by Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A.
- 37-75 Fiscal policy in debt constrained economies
by Aguiar, Mark & Amador, Manuel
- 76-102 Stability in electoral competition: A case for multiple votes
by Xefteris, Dimitrios
- 103-144 Information aggregation in a large multi-stage market game
by Hu, Tai-Wei & Wallace, Neil
- 145-160 Search for an object with two attributes
by Olszewski, Wojciech & Wolinsky, Asher
- 161-189 In and out of equilibrium I: Evolution of strategies in repeated games with discounting
by García, Julián & van Veelen, Matthijs
- 190-222 Optimal dynamic mechanism design with deadlines
by Mierendorff, Konrad
2015, Volume 160, Issue C
- 1-23 Limits to rational learning
by Levy, Yehuda John
- 24-35 Consistency and communication in committees
by Deimen, Inga & Ketelaar, Felix & Le Quement, Mark T.
- 36-55 Priority classes and weighted constrained equal awards rules for the claims problem
by Flores-Szwagrzak, Karol
- 56-71 Rational behavior under correlated uncertainty
by Frick, Mira & Romm, Assaf
- 72-101 Cooperation, punishment and immigration
by Pin, Paolo & Rogers, Brian W.
- 102-113 Expert advice to a voting body
by Schnakenberg, Keith E.
- 114-131 Implementability under monotonic transformations in differences
by Carbajal, Juan Carlos & Müller, Rudolf
- 132-149 Communication with endogenous information acquisition
by Pei, Harry Di
- 150-174 A model of regret, investor behavior, and market turbulence
by Qin, Jie
- 175-187 Dynamically consistent voting rules
by Chandrasekher, Madhav
- 188-215 Equilibrium price dispersion with sequential search
by Menzio, Guido & Trachter, Nicholas
- 216-242 A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search
by Wu, Qinggong
- 243-279 Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
by Jung, Jin Yong & Kim, Son Ku
- 280-316 Robust dynamic implementation
by Penta, Antonio
- 317-339 Common value experimentation
by Eeckhout, Jan & Weng, Xi
- 340-386 Worker mobility in a search model with adverse selection
by Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos & Kaas, Leo
- 387-428 Information acquisition in global games of regime change
by Szkup, Michal & Trevino, Isabel
- 429-437 A more general Pandora rule?
by Olszewski, Wojciech & Weber, Richard
- 438-462 Complete and incomplete financial markets in multi-good economies
by Ehling, Paul & Heyerdahl-Larsen, Christian
- 463-493 Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to others
by Dietrich, Franz
- 494-516 Loss aversion, survival and asset prices
by Easley, David & Yang, Liyan
- 517-535 The costs and benefits of coordinating with a different group
by Grout, Paul A. & Mitraille, Sébastien & Sonderegger, Silvia
- 536-556 Mean-variance utility
by Nakamura, Yutaka
2015, Volume 159, Issue PB
- 679-701 Introduction to Symposium on Dynamic Contracts and Mechanism Design
by Bergemann, Dirk & Pavan, Alessandro
- 702-727 Optimal stopping with private information
by Kruse, Thomas & Strack, Philipp
- 728-774 Revenue management by sequential screening
by Akan, Mustafa & Ata, Barış & Dana, James D.
- 775-818 Dynamic managerial compensation: A variational approach
by Garrett, Daniel F. & Pavan, Alessandro
- 819-853 Dynamic revenue maximization: A continuous time approach
by Bergemann, Dirk & Strack, Philipp
- 854-890 Optimal auction design under non-commitment
by Skreta, Vasiliki
- 891-928 Dynamic screening with limited commitment
by Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher
- 929-988 A duality approach to continuous-time contracting problems with limited commitment
by Miao, Jianjun & Zhang, Yuzhe
- 989-1015 A solvable continuous time dynamic principal–agent model
by Williams, Noah
- 1016-1055 On the smoothness of value functions and the existence of optimal strategies in diffusion models
by Strulovici, Bruno & Szydlowski, Martin
- 1056-1073 An optimal voting procedure when voting is costly
by Bognar, Katalin & Börgers, Tilman & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
- 1074-1095 Sequential information disclosure in auctions
by Bergemann, Dirk & Wambach, Achim
2015, Volume 159, Issue PA
- 1-14 Atomic Cournotian traders may be Walrasian
by Codognato, Giulio & Ghosal, Sayantan & Tonin, Simone
- 15-65 Continuous decisions by a committee: Median versus average mechanisms
by Rosar, Frank
- 66-69 Comment on “Imitation processes with small mutations” [J. Econ. Theory 131 (2006) 251–262]
by McAvoy, Alex
- 70-104 Bayesian repeated games and reputation
by Salomon, Antoine & Forges, Françoise
- 105-119 Costly monitoring, dynamic incentives, and default
by Antinolfi, Gaetano & Carli, Francesco
- 120-136 Iterated generalized half-dominance and global game selection
by Iijima, Ryota
- 137-162 Strategy-proof assignment of multiple resources
by Erlanson, Albin & Flores-Szwagrzak, Karol
- 163-208 Surprising gifts: Theory and laboratory evidence
by Khalmetski, Kiryl & Ockenfels, Axel & Werner, Peter
- 209-220 A theoretical foundation for the undercut-proof equilibrium
by Byford, Martin C.
- 221-235 Randomization devices and the elicitation of ambiguity-averse preferences
by Bade, Sophie
- 236-266 Relaxing competition through speculation: Committing to a negative supply slope
by Holmberg, Pär & Willems, Bert
- 267-279 Strategic and structural uncertainty in robust implementation
by Yamashita, Takuro
- 280-289 Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
by Wagner, Christoph & Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas
- 290-310 A dynamic generalization of Becker's assortative matching result
by Anderson, Axel
- 311-325 Efficiency of competitive equilibria in economies with time-dependent preferences
by Dziewulski, Paweł
- 326-338 Theory of decisions by intra-dimensional comparisons
by Tserenjigmid, Gerelt
- 339-368 Optimal monetary policy with heterogeneous money holdings
by Lippi, Francesco & Ragni, Stefania & Trachter, Nicholas
- 369-400 On the persistence of strategic sophistication
by Georganas, Sotiris & Healy, Paul J. & Weber, Roberto A.
- 401-442 Approximate implementation in Markovian environments
by Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan
- 443-464 The logic of backward induction
by Arieli, Itai & Aumann, Robert J.
- 465-488 Hurwicz expected utility and subjective sources
by Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
- 489-515 The wealth distribution in Bewley economies with capital income risk
by Benhabib, Jess & Bisin, Alberto & Zhu, Shenghao
- 516-530 Skill, complexity, and strategic interaction
by Lambson, Val & van den Berghe, John
- 531-551 Strategic experimentation with private payoffs
by Heidhues, Paul & Rady, Sven & Strack, Philipp
- 552-573 Contracts versus salaries in matching: A general result
by Schlegel, Jan Christoph
- 574-595 Price distortions under coarse reasoning with frequent trade
by Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin
- 596-626 Inertia in social learning from a summary statistic
by Larson, Nathan
- 627-655 Tournaments as a response to ambiguity aversion in incentive contracts
by Kellner, Christian
- 656-677 Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty
by Oury, Marion
2015, Volume 158, Issue PB
- 407-426 Information, Coordination, and Market Frictions: An Introduction
by Pavan, Alessandro & Vives, Xavier
- 427-465 Information and volatility
by Bergemann, Dirk & Heumann, Tibor & Morris, Stephen
- 466-506 Cournot competition and the social value of information
by Myatt, David P. & Wallace, Chris
- 507-535 Characterizing social value of information
by Ui, Takashi & Yoshizawa, Yasunori
- 536-557 Information and strategic behavior
by Rostek, Marzena & Weretka, Marek
- 558-584 Private information and sunspots in sequential asset markets
by Benhabib, Jess & Wang, Pengfei
- 585-633 Information acquisition and learning from prices over the business cycle
by Mäkinen, Taneli & Ohl, Björn
- 634-655 Liquid bundles
by Farhi, Emmanuel & Tirole, Jean
- 656-678 Rigid pricing and rationally inattentive consumer
by Matějka, Filip
- 679-696 Market composition and price informativeness in a large market with endogenous order types
by Challe, Edouard & Chrétien, Edouard
- 697-720 Should we regulate financial information?
by Kurlat, Pablo & Veldkamp, Laura
- 721-738 Coordination with flexible information acquisition
by Yang, Ming
- 739-768 Information quality and crises in regime-change games
by Iachan, Felipe S. & Nenov, Plamen T.
- 769-786 Financial prices and information acquisition in large Cournot markets
by Rondina, Giacomo & Shim, Myungkyu
- 787-837 Investment horizons and asset prices under asymmetric information
by Albagli, Elias
- 838-869 Reprint of: Information percolation in segmented markets
by Duffie, Darrell & Malamud, Semyon & Manso, Gustavo
2015, Volume 158, Issue PA
- 1-20 Endogenous budget constraints in auctions
by Burkett, Justin
- 21-32 Calibration without reduction for non-expected utility
by Freeman, David
- 33-53 Subjective independence and concave expected utility
by Lehrer, Ehud & Teper, Roee
- 54-86 Efficient assignment with interdependent values
by Che, Yeon-Koo & Kim, Jinwoo & Kojima, Fuhito
- 87-101 Weak assumption and iterative admissibility
by Yang, Chih-Chun
- 102-126 Reciprocal contracting
by Peters, Michael
- 127-164 Adverse selection without single crossing: Monotone solutions
by Schottmüller, Christoph
- 165-185 Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money
by Fujinaka, Yuji & Wakayama, Takuma
- 186-212 Optimal choice of health and retirement in a life-cycle model
by Kuhn, Michael & Wrzaczek, Stefan & Prskawetz, Alexia & Feichtinger, Gustav
- 213-231 On the nonemptiness of the α-core of discontinuous games: Transferable and nontransferable utilities
by Uyanık, Metin
- 232-258 Dynamic choice in a complex world
by Agastya, Murali & Slinko, Arkadii
- 259-292 Complexity and repeated implementation
by Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid
- 293-307 Which demand systems can be generated by discrete choice?
by Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John
- 308-318 Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule
by Bogomolnaia, Anna
- 319-335 Sequential auctions, price trends, and risk preferences
by Hu, Audrey & Zou, Liang
- 336-370 Impure altruism and impure selfishness
by Saito, Kota
- 371-406 Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection
by Fuchs, William & Skrzypacz, Andrzej
2015, Volume 157, Issue C
- 1-27 A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
by Newton, Jonathan & Sawa, Ryoji
- 28-48 Public information in Markov games
by Kloosterman, Andrew
- 49-75 Correlation and common priors in games with incomplete information
by Liu, Qingmin
- 76-99 Minimum cost connection networks: Truth-telling and implementation
by Hougaard, Jens Leth & Tvede, Mich
- 100-127 Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: The bilingual game and general supermodular games
by Oyama, Daisuke & Takahashi, Satoru
- 128-145 Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring
by Guéron, Yves
- 146-171 Ranking multidimensional alternatives and uncertain prospects
by Mongin, Philippe & Pivato, Marcus
- 172-187 Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution
by Newton, Jonathan & Angus, Simon D.
- 188-211 Collusion enforcement with private information and private monitoring
by Chan, Jimmy & Zhang, Wenzhang
- 212-235 Key leaders in social networks
by Zhou, Junjie & Chen, Ying-Ju
- 236-254 Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
by Borm, Peter & Ju, Yuan & Wettstein, David
- 255-294 Innovation by entrants and incumbents
by Acemoglu, Daron & Cao, Dan
- 295-314 Matching markets under (in)complete information
by Ehlers, Lars & Massó, Jordi
- 315-348 Efficiency in decentralized oligopolistic markets
by Nava, Francesco
- 349-383 Strategy-proof social choice on multiple and multi-dimensional single-peaked domains
by Reffgen, Alexander
- 384-396 The value of information under unawareness
by Galanis, Spyros
- 397-424 Unemployment risk and wage differentials
by Pinheiro, Roberto & Visschers, Ludo
- 425-444 Approachability with delayed information
by Lagziel, David & Lehrer, Ehud
- 445-477 History-dependent risk attitude
by Dillenberger, David & Rozen, Kareen
- 478-484 Breakdown in multilateral negotiations
by Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael
- 485-516 Optimal central bank lending
by Schabert, Andreas
- 517-526 Product line design
by Anderson, Simon P. & Celik, Levent
- 527-552 On the private provision of public goods on networks
by Allouch, Nizar
- 553-605 Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring
by Atakan, Alp E. & Ekmekci, Mehmet
- 606-623 Decreasing aversion under ambiguity
by Cherbonnier, Frédéric & Gollier, Christian
- 624-647 On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory
by de Clippel, Geoffroy
- 648-667 Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals
by Galperti, Simone
- 668-698 Knowledge spillovers in cities: An auction approach
by Couture, Victor
- 699-729 Variational Bewley preferences
by Faro, José Heleno
- 730-762 Put–Call Parity and market frictions
by Cerreia-Vioglio, S. & Maccheroni, F. & Marinacci, M.
- 763-792 Banking bubbles and financial crises
by Miao, Jianjun & Wang, Pengfei
- 793-810 Intertemporal coordination with delay options
by Araujo, Luis & Guimaraes, Bernardo
- 811-841 Blockbusting: Brokers and the dynamics of segregation
by Ouazad, Amine
- 842-878 Financial reporting and market efficiency with extrapolative investors
by Bianchi, Milo & Jehiel, Philippe
- 879-917 Exchangeable capacities, parameters and incomplete theories
by Epstein, Larry G. & Seo, Kyoungwon
- 918-958 An undominated mechanism for a class of informed principal problems with common values
by Balkenborg, Dieter & Makris, Miltiadis
- 959-972 On the benefits of dynamic bidding when participation is costly
by McAdams, David
- 973-1000 Optimal entry timing
by Kolb, Aaron M.
- 1001-1040 On the Mitra–Wan forest management problem in continuous time
by Fabbri, Giorgio & Faggian, Silvia & Freni, Giuseppe
- 1041-1055 Stability in large Bayesian games with heterogeneous players
by Deb, Joyee & Kalai, Ehud
- 1056-1080 Indeterminacy and sunspots in two-sector RBC models with generalized no-income-effect preferences
by Dufourt, Frédéric & Nishimura, Kazuo & Venditti, Alain
- 1081-1113 The macroeconomics of Modigliani–Miller
by Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans & Müller, Jürg
- 1114-1129 Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
by Velez, Rodrigo A.
- 1130-1158 Credit market frictions and capital structure dynamics
by Hugonnier, Julien & Malamud, Semyon & Morellec, Erwan
- 1159-1187 Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
by Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje
2015, Volume 156, Issue C
- 1-13 Introduction to computer science and economic theory
by Blume, Lawrence & Easley, David & Kleinberg, Jon & Kleinberg, Robert & Tardos, Éva
- 14-44 Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts
by Dobzinski, Shahar & Nisan, Noam
- 45-76 Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items
by Lavi, Ron & Nisan, Noam
- 77-102 Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
by Chen, Jing & Micali, Silvio
- 103-143 Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design
by Devanur, Nikhil R. & Hartline, Jason D. & Yan, Qiqi
- 144-174 Pricing lotteries
by Briest, Patrick & Chawla, Shuchi & Kleinberg, Robert & Weinberg, S. Matthew
- 175-206 Multilateral matching
by Hatfield, John William & Kominers, Scott Duke
- 207-245 Approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games
by Daskalakis, Constantinos & Papadimitriou, Christos H.
- 246-268 Algorithmic rationality: Game theory with costly computation
by Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael
- 269-316 Equilibria of dynamic games with many players: Existence, approximation, and market structure
by Adlakha, Sachin & Johari, Ramesh & Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
- 317-342 Local smoothness and the price of anarchy in splittable congestion games
by Roughgarden, Tim & Schoppmann, Florian
- 343-388 Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
by Caragiannis, Ioannis & Kaklamanis, Christos & Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis & Kyropoulou, Maria & Lucier, Brendan & Paes Leme, Renato & Tardos, Éva
- 389-416 An axiomatic characterization of wagering mechanisms
by Lambert, Nicolas S. & Langford, John & Wortman Vaughan, Jennifer & Chen, Yiling & Reeves, Daniel M. & Shoham, Yoav & Pennock, David M.
- 417-454 Bargaining dynamics in exchange networks
by Bayati, Mohsen & Borgs, Christian & Chayes, Jennifer & Kanoria, Yash & Montanari, Andrea
2015, Volume 155, Issue C
- 1-15 Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
by Lester, Benjamin & Visschers, Ludo & Wolthoff, Ronald
- 16-29 Recognition for sale
by Ali, S. Nageeb
- 30-49 On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good
by Massó, Jordi & Nicolò, Antonio & Sen, Arunava & Sharma, Tridib & Ülkü, Levent
- 50-94 Survival with ambiguity
by Guerdjikova, Ani & Sciubba, Emanuela
- 95-130 Extremal choice equilibrium with applications to large games, stochastic games, & endogenous institutions
by Barelli, Paulo & Duggan, John
- 131-151 Choice theory when agents can randomize
by Stoye, Jörg
- 152-184 Payoffs in exact TU economies
by Edhan, Omer
- 185-205 From imitation to collusion: Long-run learning in a low-information environment
by Friedman, Daniel & Huck, Steffen & Oprea, Ryan & Weidenholzer, Simon
- 206-233 Rational agents are the quickest
by Mandler, Michael
- 234-261 The dynamics of bidding markets with financial constraints
by Beker, Pablo F. & Hernando-Veciana, Ángel
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