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Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types

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Cited by:

  1. Oleksii Birulin & Sergei Izmalkov, 2022. "On advance payments in tenders with budget constrained contractors," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 53(4), pages 733-762, December.
  2. Baisa, Brian, 2017. "Auction design without quasilinear preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
  3. Li, Xinyu & Haan, Marco A. & Onderstal, Sander & Veldman, Jasper, 2025. "A wind tunnel test of wind farm auctions," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).
  4. Bobkova, Nina, 2020. "Asymmetric budget constraints in a first-price auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 186(C).
  5. Malueg, David A. & Orzach, Ram, 2009. "Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 177-180, November.
  6. Lu, Jingfeng & Parreiras, Sérgio O., 2017. "Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions Redux," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 78-91.
  7. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2008. "Properties of scoring auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 69-85, March.
  8. Maciej H. Kotowski & Fei Li, 2012. "On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-043, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 05 Aug 2013.
  9. Tristan Gagnon-Bartsch & Marco Pagnozzi & Antonio Rosato, 2021. "Projection of Private Values in Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(10), pages 3256-3298, October.
  10. Chakraborty, Indranil, 2019. "Simultaneous vs. sequential auctions with risk averse bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 209-222.
  11. Sano, Ryuji, 2023. "Post-auction investment by financially constrained bidders," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 213(C).
  12. Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014. "On the continuous equilibria of affiliated-value, all-pay auctions with private budget constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 84-108.
  13. Baisa, Brian, 2020. "Efficient multi-unit auctions for normal goods," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
  14. Kotowski, Maciej H. & Li, Fei, 2014. "The war of attrition and the revelation of valuable information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 124(3), pages 420-423.
  15. Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh & Agrawal, Ramesh Kumar, 2026. "Equilibrium bidding and expected revenue ranking when bidders have outside options," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2).
  16. Burkett, Justin, 2015. "Endogenous budget constraints in auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 158(PA), pages 1-20.
  17. Maciej H. Kotowski & Fei Li, 2012. "On the Continuous Equilibria of Affiliated-Value, All-Pay Auctions with Private Budget Constraints, Third Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 14-001, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 10 Jan 2014.
  18. Marilyn Pease & Mark Whitmeyer, 2026. "On Risk Aversion in Auctions," Papers 2603.09683, arXiv.org.
  19. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Svaiter, Benar Fux, 2010. "Optimal auction with a general distribution: Virtual valuation without densities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 21-31, January.
  20. Baisa, Brian, 2016. "Overbidding and inefficiencies in multi-unit Vickrey auctions for normal goods," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 23-35.
  21. Kotowski, Maciej H., 2020. "First-price auctions with budget constraints," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(1), January.
  22. Itzhak Rasooly & Carlos Gavidia-Calderon, 2020. "The importance of being discrete: on the inaccuracy of continuous approximations in auction theory," Papers 2006.03016, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2022.
  23. Vasserman, Shoshana & Watt, Mitchell, 2021. "Risk aversion and auction design: Theoretical and empirical evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
  24. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian & Kim, Jinwoo, 2013. "Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 659-665.
  25. Rene Kirkegaard, 2011. "Ranking Asymmetric Auctions using the Dispersive Order," Working Papers 1101, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  26. Guillaume Pommey, 2021. "Partnership Dissolution with Cash-Constrained Agents," CEIS Research Paper 514, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 10 Oct 2021.
  27. Dastidar, Krishnendu Ghosh & Jain, Sonakshi, 2023. "Favouritism and corruption in procurement auctions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 10-24.
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